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French foreign policy and the 1956 Hungarian revolution 
Gusztáv KECSKÉS D. 
 
The liberalization in the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin, often described as a “thaw”, 
which later extended to the other European countries under Soviet influence, was favorably 
accommodated by Western diplomacy, including by the Quai d’Orsay. Nevertheless Western 
diplomats were perfectly conscious of their narrow room for maneuver stemming from the 
European status quo that resulted from the end of the Second World War, and the emerging 
reality of the Cold War: the bipolar international system. They did not want to accelerate the 
process by hasty steps. This passive and careful policy was continued after the outbreak of the 
Hungarian revolution on October 23, 1956, an event that surprised Paris – just as it surprised 
the leaderships in other western countries. 
As is known, on July 26, 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser, president of Egypt, has announced the 
nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. The meticulous preparation of the military 
response by France in collaboration with Great Britain and also with Israel, the Israeli attack 
of October 29 against Egypt, followed by the launching of the Franco-British intervention in 
the Suez Canal zone limited the number of options available, and was a source of the passivity 
of the French government whose attention was fixed self-evidently on the Middle East.1 
When the representatives of the French government expressed their sympathy towards the 
revolution and condemned the Soviet policy of repression carried out in Hungary, they 
attempted to avoid declarations that might cause tensions with the USSR. The UN provided 
the ideal framework and forum for such a policy. Later, however, the putting into the 
forefront of the Hungarian case in the United Nations still appeared necessary to the French 
Foreign Ministry, as well as to the British Foreign Office, who were eager to mitigate the 
fallout from the near-universal international condemnation of their policy in Suez. The two 
                                                             
1 On October 22-24, 1956 secret Anglo-Franco-Israeli negotiations took place in Sèvres, during which 
the participants defined the scenario for the war of Suez. On the relations between the Suez campaign 
and the Hungarian revolution, see Kecskés D., Gusztáv: The Suez Crisis and the 1956 Hungarian 
Revolution, East European Quarterly, vol. XXXV, Spring 2001/1, 47-58. 
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allies wished to attain that the extraordinary session of the General Assembly of the UN, 
convened on November 1 to deal with the war of Suez, have on its agenda the Hungarian 
issue as well. They thus hoped to divide, and partly divert, attention from the crisis in the 
Middle East. However, with a view to the position of the Third World countries in the matter 
the government of the United States blocked this project. Consequently the question of the 
Hungarian revolution was officially discussed on the UN’s agenda only after the invasion by 
the Soviet Army on the 4th of November. 
The policy of prudence and non-intervention was also manifest in the fact that French 
diplomacy did not take any initiative to influence the events within the Soviet bloc. The 
activities of the Quai d’Orsay were limited to the collection, transmission and interpretation of 
information. Even though the French diplomats did good work in this respect, their 
conclusions did not weigh heavily in the balance. The obvious priorities were Suez and the 
maintenance of the European status quo. 
 
The Hungarian case and French domestic politics 
Under the conditions of the Cold War, French foreign policy was inextricably intertwined 
with internal ideological struggles.2 Disputes over the principles of communism and the 
values of the “Free World” had reached a climax exactly over the Hungarian Revolution3, 
thus, contrary to how it may seem, it was an internal rather than an international event for 
France. The government considered the Algerian War (ongoing since 1954), the Suez Crisis, 
and the establishment of European integration, to be its foreign policy priorities.  
The extremely intense reaction of the population4 and the political establishment can be 
explained by several factors. In the overly politicized atmosphere of the Cold War, French 
public opinion watched the freedom fight of the Hungarians living on the “other side” of the 
Iron Curtain closely. The French media devoted considerable space to the events, and the 
overwhelming majority of the population were outraged by the brutal actions of the Soviet 
                                                             
2 Grosser, Alfred (1972): La IVe République et sa politique extérieure, A. Colin, Paris, 35. 
3 Bernard, Jean-Pierre A. (1991): Novembre 1956 à Paris, Vingtième siècle, n° 30, avril-juin 1991, 80. 
4 Regarding the reactions of the public: Archives nationales (thereafter AN), Paris, Synthèses des 
rapports mensuels des préfets (ministère de l’Intérieur), F1 C III 1235: 1956, août à décembre, mois de 
novembre 1956; documentations of the French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP) see Sondage, 
1958/1, cf. (Bernard, 1991). 
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Union, as well as by the approval of these actions by the French Communist Party.5 The 
Hungarian Revolution represented freedom, i.e. the most important value in a Western 
mentality6, and it revived the French revolutionary tradition which was the constant theme of 
Republican cult. The mass publication in the French press of the images of combat in 
Budapest brought up intense memories of the Second World War in the consciousness of a 
major part of the population. 
The crushing of the Hungarian Revolt by the Soviets, on the one hand, and the Suez Crisis, on 
the other, provided ammunition to both anti-communist and communist political forces whose 
confrontation lasted for a long time. Although the National Assembly seldom dealt with 
questions of foreign policy under the 4th Republic, the Hungarian uprising occupied an 
important place in the debates of October-November 1956.7 The parliamentary instruments 
were abundantly used: three requests for interpellation and four motions for a resolution were 
presented. The Committee on Foreign Affairs was also focused on the Hungarian question. 
How can we explain this intense interest? The repression of the Hungarian Revolution by the 
Soviets provided a good opportunity to publicly take a stand against the French Communist 
Party which openly supported the approach of Moscow. The attitude of the Communist Party 
was condemned almost unanimously. In the face of these intense attacks, the communist 
deputies attacked the colonial policies of the government, in particular the Franco-British 
intervention in Suez. The extreme hostility between the two opposing sides clearly shows the 
great significance of these questions. On the 7th of November, the President of the National 
Assembly adjourned the meeting for 15 minutes because of unrest in the chamber. The use of 
                                                             
5 See the declaration of the Politburo of the French Communist Party, November 4th, 1956 in 
L’Humanité, on November 5, 1956. On the crisis and the tactics of the French Communist Party 
archival documents are accessible at the archives of the French Communist Party, Paris: II, Archives « 
papier », Archives de direction, archives du Secrétariat et du Bureau politique (1944-1971): Décisions 
du Secrétariat (1956-1958); Décisions du Bureau politique (1956-1958); Enregistrements audio des 
réunions du Comité central du Parti communiste français de 1952 à 1962. 
6 Békés Csaba: The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and World Politics. Cold War International History 
Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington D. C. September, 1996. 
Working paper, No. 16, 26. 
7 Sources on the debates regarding the Hungarian Revolution are available at the National Assembly 
in: Journal officiel de la République française (thereafter JORF), Débats parlementaires, Assemblée 
nationale, compte-rendu in extenso des séances, questions écrites et réponses des ministres à ces 
questions, troisième législature, session ordinaire de 1956-1957. On the activity of the the Foreign 
Affairs Committee of the National Assembly: AN: la séance du 6 novembre 1956, AN : C//15749, 
procès-verbaux des séances de la commission des Affaires étrangères (cahiers manuscrits et 
dactylographiés), 8 février 1956-27 décembre 1956. 
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old arguments which did not have any relationship with the question discussed proves that 
this was a deeper conflict (for example the communist Members of Parliament often referred 
back to the Second World War: “Hitler”, “collaborator”, “Gestapo”, etc. were terms 
frequently used by them) . 
Nevertheless most deputies attempted to express their solidarity with the Hungarian people 
through the resolution of November 7th: 
“The National Assembly bows before those who sacrificed their lives in Hungary for the 
independence of their country as well as in defense of freedom and the holy rights of 
humanity; it expresses its admiration for the unshakeable courage of the martyr 
Hungarian nation, as it proved its dedication to true political and social democracy, stood 
up to an oppressor whose actions are against humanity; the Assembly requests that the 
government do everything possible, […] in cooperation with other free nations, to help 
the Hungarians who remained in their country or escaped; and that the government take 
every step possible so that the free nations do everything to prevent the deportation of 
Hungarians who took part in the uprising...”8 
The political tensions also translated into protests and solidarity marches in the streets. The 
resolution of November 7th marked the climax of tensions in Paris. On the initiative of the 
French Association for the Atlantic Community, a very broad range of political organizations 
called for a gathering on this day at the Triumphal Arch (l'Arc de triomphe) at 6 p.m.9 A 
demonstration of solidarity was held by about 30,000 people with the participation of several 
members of the Guy Mollet government, many representatives of the National Assembly, and 
former Prime Ministers. At the end of the demonstration about 5,000 participants, mostly 
young people, besieged the offices of the French Communist Party and its newspaper 
L’Humanité. Many people were wounded in the melée and three were killed.10 
                                                             
8 JORF, p. 4525. 
9 For example: Centre des républicains sociaux, Centre national des indépendants, Parti radical 
socialiste, MRP, Anciens combattants de l’Indochine et de l’Union française, Anciens Évadés français 
en Hongrie, Campagne européenne de la jeunesse, Comité des réfugiés hongrois, Comité français pour 
l’Europe libre, Fédération nationale des femmes, Jeunesse fédéraliste de France, Mouvement 
fédéraliste européen, Union nationale des étudiants de France etc. See in: Archives du ministère des 
Affaires étrangères (hereafter AMAE): Services des Pactes, carton 210, dossier Pays non signataires 
du Pactes. Pays Satellites, rapport sur la manifestation du 7 novembre 1956 à l’Arc-de-Triomphe, 
Hommage national à la Hongrie. 
10 Bernard, 1991, 73-74. 
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The Hungarian affair provided an excellent opportunity for gaining internal political 
advantages. The Socialists began a forceful campaign against the Communists who 
compromised themselves through the Hungarian tragedy and attempted to lure away their 
voters. They even made serious efforts to win over Communist activists.11 We might even 
suspect that there were political reasons behind the considerable government solidarity efforts 
(led by the socialists) and the help provided to Hungarian refugees. The cabinet of Guy Mollet 
thus used the Hungarian question as an instrument of domestic policy. 
At the same time it is necessary to see the limits of the repercussions of the Hungarian 
uprising in France. A few weeks after the Soviet intervention of the 4th of November, at the 
end of December 1956, the interest of the public in the Hungarian tragedy decreased 
considerably. The French political establishment had already pulled the Hungarian cause off 
the agenda. In spite of the extraordinary speed of the reaction, the echoes of the Hungarian 
crisis in France did not bring any lasting or fundamental changes, neither in the views of the 
public, nor in the political life of the country. The direction of the PCF (Partie communiste 
français) led by Maurice Thorez managed to overcome its difficulties in a few weeks. The 
position occupied by the Communist Party in the French political life didn’t really change: it 
kept its deputies and its electoral base. 
We thus showed above how the French Government used the Hungarian Crisis in order to 
divert the attention from the Suez Crisis, while placing the Hungarian uprising center-stage. 
With the instrumentalisation of this cause, the Guy Mollet cabinet thus employed the same 
tactics it had used in domestic affairs. The Government contributed to the mobilization of 
public opinion against the Communists by using a national commemoration and charity event 
organized by the Interior Ministry as well as exploiting opportunities presented by the media 
(especially radio). The largest such event was a “national day” scheduled for November 18th, 
“for the cause of the Hungarian people”.12 We cannot find any traces of the effect of public 
pressure in the foreign policy decision-making regarding the Hungarian question. The great 
repercussions in France over the repression of the Hungarian insurrection were used again 
                                                             
11 Office universitaire de recherche socialiste, Paris, Archives d’organisations, Parti socialiste SFIO 
(1944-1969): sténographie des réunions du Comité directeur de la SFIO, t. 13, 1er juillet 1956-21 juin 
1957. 
12 AN: rapports des préfets 1954-1959, F1 C III 1350: Voeux et motions concernant la Hongrie 
(extraits de presse, secours à la Hongrie, journée nationale du 18 novembre), 1956, dossier: Secours à 
la Hongrie, le 10 novembre 1956, télégramme du ministère de l’Intérieur (Affaires politiques) aux 
préfets de métropole y compris Seine, journée nationale en faveur de la population hongroise. 
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when the French diplomats cited the events in Hungary in their speeches on various 
international fora, in particular in the United Nations.13 
 
French foreign policy and its sources in the international context 
The behavior of the French Government in the diplomatic field after the defeat of the 
Hungarian Revolution fell perfectly in line with the general direction of Western policy at the 
time.  The main effort remained the collection, transmission and interpretation of information. 
Let us enumerate and illustrate the factors which influenced the attitude of the Quai d’Orsay. 
The evident explanation for the French attitude is the position of the country in the 
international system. Considering the close relations of France to the “Western camp”, it 
appears normal that the French Government expressed in public its condemnation of the 
Soviet Union and the Kádár government, which came to power in Hungary as a consequence 
of crushing the revolution. Such an attitude corresponded with the expectations of the public. 
French diplomacy showed its disapproval in the course of the debates of resolutions of the UN 
General Assembly, in its bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union and Hungary by 
adopting the diplomatic boycott of the NATO countries, by receiving large numbers of 
Hungarian refugees, and finally by the support granted to the Hungarian political émigré 
organizations. However the French decision-makers did not want to go beyond a certain point. 
In short, they continued to play painstakingly according to the rules of the Cold War, in 
particular sticking to the inviolable taboo of the spheres of influence. This prudence was 
translated in the general attitude and approach of the French Foreign Ministry in this area: it 
did not try to exert its influence on the course of the Hungarian revolutionary events, or in 
their aftermath. Consequently, the major part of the diplomatic activities of the French 
Government was carried out outside of the area directly affected by the crisis, in the 
negotiating rooms and halls of the United Nations and NATO. 
In the United Nations where the Hungarian question was on the agenda of the General 
Assembly for more than six years, until December 1962, the aim set by the French 
Government became more and more obvious: in collaboration with the Americans, it wished 
to exert an influence on world public opinion, especially on Third World countries by 
                                                             
13 See the speech of Foreign Minister Christian Pineau, delivered in the General Assembly of the 
United Nations on November 19, 1956. AMAE: Nations unies et organisations internationales, boîte 
243, n° 2526 (November 19, 1956), télégramme de V. Broustra, chef de la Mission permanente de la 
France auprès de l’Organisation des nations unies. 
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showing them “the true face” of the Soviet Union. The Atlantic Alliance, in addition to the 
consultations between the ministries of foreign affairs, was used to harmonize the policies of 
its member countries. Even if Paris took a zealous part in the diplomatic boycott against 
Moscow and Budapest, it is characteristic of its behavior that the retaliatory measures of 
NATO were removed vis-à-vis the USSR, in January 1957, without keeping any account of 
the Western public opinion.14 However, they held the Kádár government in isolation for much 
longer, even as they knew that it was only a puppet government. The maintenance of the 
boycott against the official Hungarian authorities appeared to carry less risk, and cause less 
harm, for the Quai d’Orsay which could thus satisfy the expectations of French public 
opinion. In spite of this “reservedness,” the French Government did not intend to break 
relations completely. It meticulously avoided any action that could have endangered the 
operations and/or the existence of the French legation in Hungary.15 Therefore, it should not 
have come as a surprise that the French diplomatic mission in Budapest used its contacts with 
resistance groups and the opposition of the Kádár regime merely as sources of information. 
Isolated examples of cooperation occurred in the first few months after the suppression of the 
revolution. 
There was a certain caution in handling the question of political emigration. For example, 
although the French authorities permitted the Hungarian Revolutionary Council to hold its 
founding conference in Strasbourg in early January 1957, they declared at the same time 
unequivocally that they would not allow the refugees to acquire weapons or transport them on 
French territory.16 Such a gesture could have led to an open conflict with the Soviet Union. 
Finally, the French representative in NATO opposed the idea of publicizing the fact that the 
Alliance was deliberating on the Hungarian question,17 not only during the revolution but also 
                                                             
14 AMAE: Service des pactes, carton 210, n° 50.012 (January 9, 1957), télégramme d’Alexandre 
Parodi, représentant permanent de la France auprès du Conseil de l’Atlantique Nord, Assistance des 
représentants des pays atlantiques aux réceptions soviétiques. 
15 Note de la sous-direction d’Europe orientale du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Relations 
diplomatiques avec la Hongrie (early 1957?), Documents diplomatiques francais (hereafter DDF), 
1957, t. I (1er janvier-30 juin), Paris, Ministère des Affaires étrangères, 1990, 2-4. 
16 AMAE: Europe 1944-1960, Hongrie, dossier 97, (December 13, 1956). Note de la Sous-direction 
d’Europe orientale pour le secrétaire général, Création en Occident d’un « Comité national 
révolutionnaire » hongrois. 
17 AMAE: Nations unies et organisations internationales, boîte 242, n° 50.408 (October 27, 1956), 
télégramme d’A. Parodi, représentant permanent de France au Conseil de l’OTAN. 
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in December 1956. Regarding the assistance to the refuge students, the Quai d’Orsay stated 
that “it would be preferable to avoid any direct action of NATO.”18 
In close connection with the previously described factors, a second factor influenced the 
French diplomatic behavior, which was the intention to coordinate its actions in a tightknit 
multilateral co-operation, meaning close cooperation with the United States and Great Britain. 
French diplomats conducted intensive discussions with their allies about the relations with the 
Kádár Government, the taking in of Hungarian refugees, and the actions intended to provide 
humanitarian aid to the population of Hungary. If an initiative by the French had not been 
supported by the NATO allies, the Quai d’Orsay abandoned it; this was the fate of a French 
proposal for economic aid to Hungary in the first month of 1957.19 
Once the Suez Crisis passed, the influence of this factor decreased gradually on French 
decision-making and the Algerian problem took a more prominent role, with the war there 
lasting until 1962. The policy carried out in Algeria reduced to a certain extent the room for 
manoeuvre of France at the United Nations. All in all, we can say that the bipolar system of 
international relations did not cease to be a determining factor for French diplomacy towards 
Hungary during the aftermath of the revolution. It was its strategic determinant and French 
interests in the Middle East were the tactical and temporary drivers of French policy. 
The division of the world into separate spheres of influence meant a policy of non-
intervention, even a passive stance, for the French Government. The policy of the peaceful 
subversion of the socialist countries, which meant encouraging them to pursue more 
independent foreign policies from the Soviet Union, and more liberal policies at home, 
through economic, political and cultural contacts20 was the line from which France never 
deviated. More energetic measures were, however, not envisioned. The acceptance of 
Hungary’s neutrality during the revolution or foreign minister Pineau’s proposal for 
                                                             
18 Archives du secrétariat international de l’OTAN (thereafter ASIO, Bruxelles): AC/52-R/67 (January 
8, 1957), procès-verbal de la réunion du Comité de l’information et des relations culturelles tenue au 
Palais de Chaillot, Paris, le 18 décembre 1956 à 15 heures. 
19 AMAE: Service des pactes, carton 210, n° 50.132 (March 6, 1957), télégramme d’A. Parodi, 
représentant permanent de la France auprès du Conseil de l’Atlantique Nord, Aide à la Hongrie. 
20 Békés Csaba: Az 1956-os forradalom a világpolitikában [The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and 
World Politics]. Tanulmány és válogatott dokumentumok. Budapest, 1956-os Intézet, 1996, 77. 
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Hungary’s neutralization presented at the National Assembly21 on December 18, 1956 cannot 
be considered as serious political moves. The international weight of France did not allow for 
such grand initiatives to be effective. In the same way, similar remarks by Jean Paul-Boncour, 
minister of France in Hungary, addressed to Chou En-laï, president of the Chinese Council of 
Ministers in January 1957 in Budapest, were in fact only a simple attempt at demonstrating 
France’s “proactive” policy at no great risk.22 
The other factors, namely the impact of the Suez Crisis and later the War in Algeria were not 
without influence on French foreign policy, in particular in the United Nations. However, 
these conflicts played only a minor role and were of a tactical nature compared to the 
European status quo. The extremely intense reaction of French society and the French 
political establishment had only a limited impact on the decision making at the Quai d’Orsay. 
Admittedly, French diplomats felt towards Hungary a similar compassion to the one 
expressed by the greater public23 nevertheless, the great emotional reaction and the individual 
demonstrations of sympathy did not have any impact on the eventual policy. 
The Hungarian crisis remained beyond the sphere of French interest. Its representatives acted 
directly only in the UN, NATO, and in working for the Hungarian refugees. In other words, 
Paris concentrated its activities in areas where it could act without the fear of direct 
confrontation with the Soviet Union. French diplomacy considered the continuation of 
disarmament and détente as its primary objective, and it therefore believed that the 
maintenance of dialogue with the Soviet Union was more important than providing support 
for the liberation of the peoples of East-Central Europe. This position was stated clearly when 
Imre Nagy, the former Hungarian Prime Minister, was executed; the two issues would not be 
linked. 
                                                             
21 JORF, Débats parlementaires, Assemblée nationale, compte rendu in extenso des séances, questions 
écrites et réponses des ministres à ces questions, troisième législature, session ordinaire de 1956-1957, 
1ère séance du 18 décembre 1956, 6090. 
22 Télégramme de Jean Paul-Boncour, ministre de France en Hongrie, n° 65 à 69 (January 18, 1957), 
DDF, 1957, t. I, op. cit., 104-105. 
23 Kecskés D., Gusztáv: De l’autre côté du “rideau de fer”… La révolution hongroise de 1956 et la 
politique étrangère française à la lumière de quelques entretiens avec d’anciens diplomates, Specimina 
Nova, 1999, 155-171. 
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As Étienne de Crouy-Chanel, the French permanent representative in the NATO Council on 
June 20, 1958 stated:24 
“The dialogue between East and West belongs to a different page, its stake is too 
high for us to be led solely by our emotion. Public opinion, which would probably 
understand if we discontinued the dialogue with the Soviet Union today because 
of the execution of Nagy, in a few months, however, would probably rebuke us 
for doing so. Therefore, we do not believe in breaking off relations.” 
It is evident from the available sources that the government of Guy Mollet did not consider 
the Hungarian uprising to be of primary concern, neither internally nor diplomatically. During 
meetings of the Council of Ministers at the time of the Hungarian Revolution, the issue was 
discussed only once. The first decision concerning the Hungarian Revolution was made on 
November 7th, when they made a decision on accepting refugees.25 
In November-December 1956, during discussions with the most important allies of the French 
Government, the Hungarian Revolution was rarely mentioned, or was entirely neglected. At a 
meeting between the German chancellor Konrad Adenauer, and Guy Mollet on November 6th, 
the major topic of discussion was European integration.26 Hervé Alphand, the French 
ambassador to Washington, when visiting President Eisenhower on November 8th, 
emphasized that the alliance between the United States, Great Britain, and France, should be 
strengthened because the Suez Crisis shook the foundations of mutual confidence27. Finally, 
the British and French negotiations concentrated on the Suez Crisis and its consequences28. 
Undoubtedly, the Hungarian Revolution was not of primary importance for either Paris or the 
                                                             
24 AMAE: Services des pactes, boîte 241, n° 57 (June 20, 1958), télégramme d’Étienne de Crouy-
Chanel, représentant permanent de France au Conseil de l’OTAN. 
25 The author did not have an opportunity to study the minutes of the meetings of the Council of 
Ministers. The article relies here on the remarks made by Patricia Gillet, archivist at the Section of the 
20th century of the National Archives (Paris), who communicated certain information to the author, 
and on the examination of the cartons F60 2766 (Ordre du jour du Conseil des ministres, 1956-1958, 
dossier: janvier 1956-décembre 1956) and F60 2772 (communiqués de presse des Conseils des 
ministres, dossier: janvier 1956-décembre 1959). 
26 AMAE: Secrétariat général (1945-1966), « Entretiens et message », 3 septembre 1956-septembre 
1957, procès-verbal de l’entretien du 6 novembre 1956 entre G. Mollet et K. Adenauer (DDF, 1956, t. 
III, 24 octobre-31 décembre, Paris, 1990, 231-238.). 
27 AMAE: Secrétariat général (1945-1960), Suez, 82, n° 7028 à 7038 (November 8, 1956), télégramme 
de Hervé Alphand, ambassadeur de France aux États-Unis (DDF, 1956, t. III. op. cit., 251-253). 
28 AMAE: Secrétariat général (1945-1966), « Entretiens et message », 3 septembre 1956-septembre 
1957, n° 278/SGL (December 4, 1956), rapport de Jean Chauvel, ambassadeur de France en Grande-
Bretagne. 
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other Western capitals. The Council of the Western European Union29 and the ministerial 
level NATO Council meetings of December 10th and December 11th-14th (both held in Paris) 
expressed similar attitudes. Beside the Guy Mollet Government other Western governments 
were also aware of the fact – in contrast to their own public opinions – that their possibilities 
to influence the revolutionary events in Hungary were indeed limited. More energetic steps, 
let alone a military intervention in the Soviet Bloc, did not occur as a possibility to them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
29 Compte-rendu de la séance du Conseil de l’UEO du 10 décembre 1956, DDF, 1956, t. III, op. cit., 
512-518. 
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The secret negotiations of the Western Great Powers during the  
1956 Hungarian Revolution 
Csaba BÉKÉS 
 
The leaders of the Western great powers, the United States, Great Britain and France — unlike 
their public opinion which expressed vivid solidarity with the Hungarian revolution from the 
beginning—were acutely aware of their extremely limited room to maneuver within the existing 
European status quo and reacted with great caution to the uprising in Hungary from its very 
beginning. Consequently, in most instances, they went so far as to give explicit public 
endorsement of the principle of nonintervention. Behind the Western response to the Hungarian 
Revolution was the realization that under the prevailing international political circumstances, any 
sort of Western military intervention in Hungary contained the implicit threat of a third world 
war with the Soviet Union, to be waged with thermonuclear weapons, which would likely first 
lead to the obliteration of the very Eastern European peoples which intervention was designed to 
liberate, and then of the rest of the World.30 
It was at this time that the Eisenhower administration was confronted with the fact that, 
contrary to one of the predominant themes of the massive liberation propaganda it aimed at 
Eastern Europe since 1953, even the United States, the world’s greatest military power, had 
extremely limited options regarding any sort of intervention within the Soviet sphere of 
influence.  It was nonetheless very important for Washington to conceal this impotence in order 
to preserve its international prestige, therefore the US administration decided on 25 October  
that in concert with its closest allies, it would initiate discussion  in the United Nations on the 
subject of the Hungarian uprising.31 The British and French initially expressed reluctance when 
US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles proposed on 26 October that the three countries 
                                                             
30 On the international context of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution see: Csaba Békés: The 1956 
Hungarian Revolution and World Politics. Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars, Washington D.C., September, 1996. Working Paper No. 16. 
31 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-57. Eastern Europe. Volume XXV. United States  
Government Printing Office Washington D.C., 1990. (Henceforth: FRUS Vol. XXV) 290-291. 
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launch a joint initiative to convene a meeting of the UN Security Council.32  With the Suez 
campaign having already been definitely decided upon, the British and French leadership was 
worried that if the question of Soviet intervention in Hungary were put on the agenda and 
discussed in the UN, it might serve as a precedent for a similar procedure regarding the joint 
Israeli-British-French attack on Egypt which was to take place at the end of October.  But since 
they had not informed the United States of their plans, they were forced to accede to American 
pressure and on 27 October the United States, Great Britain33 and France34 submitted a joint 
request that the Security Council be convened to examine the situation in Hungary.   
From this date until 3 November the representatives of these three Western great powers met 
continually behind the scenes in order to work out a UN strategy which all could agree on; the 
comportment of the United States, Britain, and France during the three Security Council 
sessions which dealt with the Hungarian question on 28 October, 2 and 3 November was 
completely planned in advance during these secret negotiations.35 
In the days preceding the Israeli attack on Egypt the UN representatives of the three Western 
great powers agreed that it was imperative to voice emphatic public condemnation of the Soviet 
intervention and that beyond this action they would employ a wait-and-see policy until the 
                                                             
32 Public Record Office, London-Kew, Foreign Office, General Correspondence, 371 (Henceforth: PRO, 
FO) 122378 NH 10110/188 Foreign Office minute, 26 October, 1956; Documents diplomatiques 
français 1956. Tome III. (24 octobre-31 decembre). Paris, Ministere des Affaires Étrangeres, 1990, 
1956, Tome III. 19. 
33 On British policy towards the Hungarian crisis see: Békés Csaba: A brit kormány és az 1956-os 
magyar forradalom [The British Government and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution] In: Évkönyv, 1992, 
1956-os Intézet, Budapest, 19–38. [Yearbook, 1992, Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian 
Revolution]; See also: James Cable: Britain and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.  International 
Relations, Vol. 9, Issue 4, 1988.  For British documents produced during the revolution, see: Éva 
Haraszty-Taylor (ed.): The Hungarian Revolution of 1956. A Collection of of Documents from the 
British Foreign Office, Astra Press, Nottingham, 1995. This selection primarily includes reports sent 
by the British legation in Budapest to London, with the Foreign Office's comments, and thus with 
some exceptions do not touch on the deliberations at the U.N. 
34 On French policy towards the Hungarian Revolution see: Gusztáv Kecskés: Gusztáv D. Kecskés: 
French Foreign policy and the 1956 Hungarian revolution. COJOURN, (Corvinus Journal of 
International Affairs)  Vol. 1. No. 3. 2016. (http://cojourn.blogspot.hu) 
35 For the story of the secret talks of the three Western Great Powers on the Hungarian situation see: 
Csaba Békés: The Hungarian Question on the UN Agenda. British Foreign Office Documents from 
1956. The Hungarian Quarterly, Spring, 2000, 103-122. 
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confused situation in Hungary became more transparent.36  The consequence of this policy was 
that the three Western powers which had placed the Hungarian question on the agenda did not 
even introduce a draft resolution during the 28 October session of the Security Council.  After 
the widening of the armed conflict in the Middle East with the engagement of Great Britain and 
France on 31 October, the tenor of the negotiations among the Western great powers regarding 
Hungary changed completely.  Eisenhower and Dulles, who had placed increasing importance 
on establishing good relations with the Arab world with the aim of expanding American 
influence in the Middle East, reacted furiously to the actions of their European allies. Not only 
did they publicly condemn the Suez action, but they also instructed the American UN 
representative to submit a draft proposal calling for the immediate cessation of all military 
operations in the Middle East, a motion which brought about a circumstance which had no 
precedent in the history of the UN with the representatives of the United States and the Soviet 
Union voting in concert against Great Britain and France.37   
As a result of the sudden deterioration in relations between the Western great powers, 
subsequent discussions between them regarding the Hungarian question were conducted in an 
increasingly icy atmosphere in which the negotiating partners were not really interested in 
condemning, much less impeding Soviet intervention, but wanted rather to exploit the 
Hungarian crisis in the name of their own, in this case drastically conflicting, great power 
interests.  Beginning at this time, the British and French undertook to get the Hungarian 
question moved from the Security Council to the first emergency session of the General 
Assembly—which had been convened to discuss the Suez crisis on 31 October—where they 
hoped that the simultaneous treatment of the two issues would lead to a mitigation of the 
censure they had been receiving.  Transfer of the Hungarian question to the General Assembly 
would have been of incidental benefit to the forces of change in Hungary, for in the General 
Assembly there is no veto power, which left at least the theoretical possibility that the UN 
would pass a resolution having a positive influence on the outcome of events in Hungary. The 
sole objective of the American leadership, however, under the existing circumstances was to 
resolve the Middle Eastern crisis, which they did; therefore they did everything within their 
                                                             
36 See especially the following documents: Telegram by UK UN representative Sir Pierson Dixon to 
the Foreign Office, 27 October, 1956. PRO FO 371 122376 NH10110/110; Telegram by UK UN 
representative Sir Pierson Dixon to the Foreign Office, 28 October, 1956. PRO FO 371 122376 
NH10110/111; Foreign Office telegram to the UK representative at the UN, 28 October, 1956.  
PRO FO 371 122376 NH10110/107; Telegram by UK UN representative Sir Pierson Dixon to the 
Foreign Office, 29 October, 1956. PRO FO 371 122380 NH10110/241.  
37 On the history of the Suez ciris see: Kyle Keith: Suez. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.  
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powers to frustrate the aforementioned strategy of the British and French. Thus, until 4 
November the Americans succeeded in preventing them from submitting a draft resolution 
concerning the Hungarian question in the Security Council and further blocked them from 
referring the question to the emergency session of the General Assembly via the ‘uniting for 
peace’ procedure.38 
After the second Soviet intervention on 4 November, the American UN representative, Henry 
Cabot Lodge, unilaterally implemented the former British–French strategy without asking for 
the cooperation of his European Security Council allies, with whom he had broken off 
negotiations regarding Hungary the previous day as a method of punishment for British and 
French actions in Suez.  When the Security Council was subsequently convened upon the 
arrival of the news regarding renewed Soviet intervention on 4 November, Lodge himself 
initiated a “uniting for peace” procedure which effectively circumvented the Soviet veto and 
referred the Hungarian question directly to the second emergency session of the General 
Assembly.  On the afternoon of the very same day a large majority of this body voted to adopt 
a draft resolution—likewise submitted unilaterally by the US representative—which 
condemned the intervention of the Soviet Union, called for it to withdraw its troops from 
Hungary, and recognized the right of the Hungarian people to a government which would 
represent its national interests.39 
At the same time, this resolution, made not even a reference to Hungary’s withdrawal from the 
Warsaw Pact and the recognition of Hungary’s neutrality, declared on 1 November, for which 
Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy had so emphatically appealed in his messages to the UN 
secretary general on 1 and 2  November.40 
                                                             
38 On the  the emerging sharp conflict between the US and British (and French) governments during 
the secret trilateral talks in the UN see the reports by the UK UN representative, Sir Pirson Dixon: 
Telegram by UK UN representative Sir Pierson Dixon to the Foreign Office, 2 November, 1956. PRO 
FO 371 122381 NH10110/292; Telegram by UK UN representative Sir Pierson Dixon to the Foreign 
Office, 3 November, 1956. PRO FO 371 122381 NH10110/293; Telegram by UK UN representative 
Sir Pierson Dixon to the Foreign Office, 3 November, 1956. PRO FO 371 122381 NH10110/280.  
39United Nations. General Assembly. Official Records. First and Second Emergency Special Sessions, 
1–10 November 1956. Plenary Meetings and Annexes. New York: 1956. Minutes of the plenary meeting 
on 4 November, 1956. A/3286. 
40 On the history of Hungary’s neutrality in 1956 see: Csaba Békés: The 1956 Hungarian Revolution 
and the Declaration of Neutrality. Cold War History, Vol. 6. No. 4. November, 2006. 477–500. 
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This is all the more interesting as the British and the French did support Hungary’s neutrality 
from the outset41, hoping that an issue of such importance and an unprecedented move by a 
Soviet Bloc state would help transfer the Hungarian issue from the Security Council to the 
General Assembly. Neglecting this crucial issue in the UN GA resolution was due to the fact that 
for Washington, now acting unilaterally in the UN in the case of Hungary, the country’s 
neutrality was unacceptable. While the concept of Hungarian neutrality engendered a good deal 
of support in the State Department where it had already surfaced as a topic of discussion days 
before Nagy launched his appeals to the UN, for the leading personalities of the American 
leadership this option was unacceptable for different reasons. Dulles, who had sharp misgivings 
regarding the increasingly powerful nonaligned movement, and was therefore generally ill-
disposed toward the idea of neutrality, not surprisingly, came out against the idea with regard to 
Hungary. He firmly believed that if, perchance, Hungary were to succeed in its struggle to free 
itself of Soviet domination, the United States should not rest satisfied with the country’s 
neutrality when there existed the real possibility of incorporating it into the Western sphere of 
influence.42 President Eisenhower himself sympathized with the idea of establishing a zone of 
neutral states in Central and Eastern Europe but he hoped to achieve this aim through 
negotiations with the Soviets in a framework of general reconstruction of East-West 
relationships. It is a paradox of history that although the evolutionary views of Eisenhower 
and Imre Nagy on neutrality were very similar, the Hungarian decision made in an 
extraordinary situation simply could not be supported by Washington taking into account real 
political considerations. Overtly supporting the unilateral radical move of the Hungarian 
government, that is recognizing their neutrality, had the possible danger that the American 
government would take on an international responsibility which would be extremely difficult to 
cast off after the suppression of the Hungarian uprising, which was seemingly close at hand.  
However, it was even more important for Eisenhower that such a diplomatic move, due to the 
probably vehement Soviet reaction, would have seriously jeopardized the well improving Soviet-
American relations, and indirectly the whole détente process unfolding after 1953. 
In the early hours of the morning of 4 November, the United States nonetheless fervently 
condemned renewed Soviet intervention in Hungary—Eisenhower even sent a personal 
                                                             
41 Foreign Office telegram to the UK representative at the UN, 1 November, 1956. PRO FO 371 
122382 NH10110/332. 
42 D. D. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversations Series. Minute of 
discussion between Harold E. Stassen and John Foster Dulles, 26 October, 1956. Printed In: FRUS 1955-
1957 Vol. XXV. 305. 
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message of protest to Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin—and in this way succeeded in leading 
the world to believe that it had, from the very outset, played a constructive role in attempts to 
settle both the Suez and Hungarian crises. 
The real clash of conflicting viewpoints in the United Nations, contrary to earlier 
interpretations, took place not between the Western powers and the Soviet Union during 
meetings of the Security Council where what was said on both sides was primarily for public 
consumption, but behind the scenes, in the course of secret negotiations between the 
representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and France.  The result of the discord which 
arose in relations between the  Western great powers over the Suez crisis was that the UN was 
unable to take firm steps toward the resolution of the Hungarian question at a time (from 1–3 
November) when the circumstances in Hungary, such as Nagy’s request for UN mediation, 
made such steps feasible.   
One should not overestimate, however, the potential influence of any UN resolution by the 
Second Emergency Session of the General Assembly condemning Soviet intervention, a 
measure which remained a distinct possibility right up until 3 November.  The Soviet Union, in 
light of its status as a world superpower and the reassuring pledges it had received from the 
United States, was by no means disposed to let the moral authority of UN resolutions prevent it 
from intervening militarily, if necessary, to restore order in a country within its own sphere of 
influence. 
The discord among the Western powers which came about as a result of the Middle Eastern 
conflict no doubt made things easier for the Soviets, though it is fairly certain that even without 
the Suez crisis they would have pursued a similar policy. To verify this statement is sufficient to 
examine the circumstances of the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia: at that time the 
Western alliance's freedom of movement was not restricted by any internal conflict, the West 
still responded to the invasion aimed at rescuing the communist regime with the same 
passivity than in 1956. Moreover, we now know that US President Lyndon B. Johnson who at 
the end of August 1968 condemned the intervention in Czechoslovakia in a high-sounding 
declaration for the public, barely a few weeks (!) later, in September proposed a summit 
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meeting with Brezhnev via diplomatic channels on Vietnam, the situation in the Middle East, 
as well as to discuss the issue of anti-missile systems.43 
Therefore, Western passivity in 1956 was not caused by the Suez crisis, but by a limitation to its 
range of options in Eastern Europe implicit in the prevailing European status quo and the notion 
of spheres of influence.  The Suez crisis simply served as a handy excuse, especially for the 
United States, in order to explain why, after years of liberation propaganda, it was not capable of 
extending even the smallest amount of support to an East European nation which had risen in 
arms in an attempt to liberate itself from Soviet domination. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
43 Békés Csaba: Európából Európába. Magyarország konfliktusok kereszttüzében, 1945–1990. [From 
Europe to Europe. Hungary in the Crossfire of Conflicts, 1945–1990] Budapest, Gondolat Kiadó, 
2004, 236; Anatoly Dobrinin: In confidence. Moscow’s ambassador to America’s six Cold War 
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Document 1 
Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – October 24 195644 
 
 
 
CABLE 1  
 
Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest  
 
T. n°622 to 624. Urgent.                                      Budapest, 24 October 1956, 2h 
                                                                                 (Received: 13h. 32, 12h. 50)  
 
 
Unlike the rumpus of Petöfi club five months ago, student demonstrations to which the public 
has massively joined, reflect a sickness that is beginning to be unleashed throughout the 
Hungarian nation. 
 
We have just learned about a meeting of a thousand people last week in Györ under the 
chairmanship of Gyula Hay, who is known to the Ministry by the reports of my cultural 
attaché, as he had the leading role on the occasion of the recent National Congress of Writers. 
 
Characteristic of the state of mind of the populations of the provinces is the way in which 
orators ask if it has really become possible to expose publicly what everyone wants or claims. 
 
There were vows of the same order that the students loudly expressed today in the streets of 
the capital. 
 
There is also the restoration of Cardinal Mindszenty in his position as primate of Hungary; it 
is remarkable that the crowd of Budapest has said nothing until today; moreover, when the 
demonstrators hooted at the lit-up star  at the top of the parliament, voices have risen in the 
crowd to blame them. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
44 The source of all documents in this collection is: Documents diplomatiques français 1956. [DDF] 
Tome III. (24 octobre-31 decembre). Paris, Ministere des Affaires Étrangeres, 1990, 1956, Tome III. – 
The footnotes of the documents written by the editors of DDF are not translated here.  
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Document 2 
Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Ambassadors of France in London 
and Washington – October 26 1956 
 
CABLE 19  
Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to ambassadors from France to London and 
Washington 
Paris, 26 october 1956, 21h10 
 
T. n° 11343 to 11345; 11528 to 11530. Very urgent. Priority. Reserved.  
 
The embassy of the United States has consulted today the Ministry  in order to know if it 
would be convenient to  take steps in the United Nations  concerning the intervention of the 
Soviet troops in Hungary. 
The State Department thinks that a letter could be addressed to the President of the Security 
Council to bring the attention of the Council to the situation created in Hungary by the use of 
Soviet forces against the Hungarian people who claim the rights and freedoms registered in 
the Charter and the guaranties by the peace treaty. The letter would request the members of 
the Security Council to examine the situation in order to determine if it is likely to endanger 
peace and the security, and if it is the case, to consider constructive measures that the Council 
could decide. One could also think about a resolution which would propose the establishment 
of a commission which would have to establish the facts and to submit report with the 
Council. 
I estimate that, if the principle of this approach were to be retained, it would be eminently 
desirable that the initiative would be taken by a European state, a signatory to the treaty with 
Hungary.  
I fear indeed that Soviet propaganda may not argue from an American approach to try to 
justify their allegations concerning collusion between the United States and the 
insurrectionists.  
The press announces in addition that the insurrectionists asked the minister from England in 
Budapest that Great Britain intervenes in the United Nations.  
I would thus wish, before making a decision, to know the intentions of the Foreign Office for 
this subject.  
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Document 3 
Report of Mr. De Boisanger, Ambassador of France in Prague, 
to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 26 1956 
 
CABLE 22 
Mr. De Boisanger, Ambassador of France in Prague,  
     To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign affairs.  
 
 
T. n°1096. Reserved.                                                                         Prague, October 26, 1956, 
19 h.  
                                                                                                              (Received: 23 h. 14.) 
 
 
Although a complete calm continues to prevail in Czechoslovakia, it is clear that the events in 
Hungary cause great concern to the leaders in Prague. This concern is manifested both by the 
security measures that are openly taken and by the extremely violent tone taken by the 
Communist Party’s newspaper towards the “intrigues of reaction “.  
 
If the uprising in Budapest had to have some echo here, it is probably in Slovakia first that it 
is perceptible, both because of the immediate vicinity of Hungary and the presence of a large 
Hungarian minority that has feelings of autonomy of their population towards Prague and of 
the hostility more marked than elsewhere towards the regime. 
 
 
Document 4 
Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – October 26 1956 
 
CABLE 23  
Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest, to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Budapest, 26 October 1956. 
T. n°640. Top Secret.  
Description of the military aspects of the situation, according to the military attaché.  
 
The popularity of Imre Nagy is compromised by the bloody Soviet repression as well as his 
attempt to obtain the pacification of the country by the promise of the dismissal of Gerö and 
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the evacuation of the Soviet troops from Hungary. The  newspaper of the Communist party is, 
this morning, moreover was more evasive than the government regarding the evacuation of 
the Soviet troops, as indeed is for an amnesty. The insurrectionists, after taking over a printing 
works last night, succeeded in sending into the province trucks from the Communist party in 
charge of proclamations, announcing that a provisional left government had just been made 
up, to which Kadar and Nagy had been invited to join without taking « direction » of it.  
Intended for Imre Nagy, the  newspaper of the Hungarian central trade-union published a vast 
program whose immediate interest is reduced to call on the intelligentsia and workers so that, 
associated in company councils, they immediately take over the direction of the factories with 
the central trade-union. 
I must report that part of the crowd, beseeching the protective intervention of marshal Tito, 
after being massacred on the outskirts of the Parliament, went yesterday outside the legation 
of Yugoslavia. My car was stopped by other groups requesting an intervention  in the U.N.; 
many phone calls reached us for the same ends. 
 
 
Document 5 
Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – October 26 1956 
 
CABLE 24  
Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest,  
 to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
 
Budapest, 26th October 1956. 
D. n°1022. 
 
We know that since the Poznan affair, the Hungarian intelligentsia, increasingly followed by 
the mass of people divided between new hopes and an intense feeling of oppression, did not 
stop gradually overheating spirits to the point of, starting from October 23rd, bloody riots 
whose observers however had, up to that point, dismissed the hypothesis.  
The starting point of the situation must be sought in the circulation of an article published by a 
new newspaper, The Engineer of the Future,  an organ of the students of the technical 
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University. This article claimed, inter alia needs, the immediate departure of the Russian 
troops, the re-establishment of the Hungarian national flag and the demolition of the statue of 
Stalin, a monument both colossal and, in the eyes of everyone, symbolic. At the same time, 
the students of the technical University circulate a leaflet inviting the population to a 
demonstration of sympathy for the Polish people. 
The initial reaction of the public authorities is to prohibit this demonstration. But since the 
word on the street is that flowers are being placed on the statue of General Bem, a Polish -
hero of Hungarian war of independence, the government resigns itself to give its 
authorization.  
From this moment, the events begin to move quickly; one ultimately reckons that 200.000 
people made up the crowd of students, then, increasingly, of workers and soldiers who, with 
tricolor flags on their heads, march in front of the statue of Bem while singing the national 
anthem and then La Marseillaise. The demonstrators, passing in front of the Ministry of the 
Foreign Affairs, demand, and obtain, that this building is draped with the tricolor colors. In 
front of the ministry of the Interior, they claim the return of Nagy to power and the election of 
a free Parliament.  
In the evening of the 23rd workers, having finished work, unite with the crowd. They all then 
move towards the Parliament, and then towards the Radio with the hope of putting pressure 
on Gerö who was about to speak there: it was a waste of time, because he makes a speech 
which is the flattest bunch of slogans that could grow in the brain of a party member, and in 
which, in particular, there was sharp praise of the behaviour of the U.S.S.R. Far from 
alleviating spirits, this declaration raises the temperature and, in a few hours, the 
demonstrators spread themselves across all parts of the city, occupying the crossroads, 
stopping and emptying official cars of their contents. 
In the same time, a group moves towards the statue of Stalin: which resists their efforts to 
make it rock. Over the course of an hour, with the gleam of lit fires on all sides, specialists 
attack it with the blowtorch. Finally, around 10 p.m, it is on the ground. Already the 
demonstration had become a riot; around 11 p.m, the machine-guns start to fire.  
The disorders change aspect owing to the fact that the students are now doubled in number by 
older men, helped by numerous girls and women who were not the least courageous. The 
objectives take shape: initially at 10 p.m., the Radio which, over the next few days, changes 
hands on several occasions, then the newspaper of the party, Szabad Nep, whose presses are 
broken. Soon the rioters, requisitioning the trucks of the factories and the public services, are 
able to transport the theatre of the operations from one point to another; they are looked after 
by medical students provided with ambulances. The few weapons which they were able to get 
at the beginning increase with those obtained from fraternization with the Honved and, later 
on, from plundering a barrack. 
During the day of 24 October, the Central Committee of the party had a constant session and 
the reaction of the government manifested itself in  two different fields.Initially, on the 
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political plan, it endeavoured to give the government a new face by announcing that morning 
the entry of Imre Nagy into the Central Bureau of the party, and the reorganization of this 
organization like that of the Central committee.However, the insurrectionists have no illusions 
about the actual extent of this measure: Nagy, although promoted at the Political Committee, 
remains there in the minority and becomes – in a certain sense – a hostage; Gerö and Hegedus 
continue to occupy the premier positions. Very quickly, public opinion is angry at Nagy to 
have given into this comedy. 
In addition, these illusory concessions do not prevent military repression: troops armed with 
machine-guns, tanks and armored cars patrol everywhere in the city where they encounter 
strong resistance. At the same time, the government demands surrender, initially for October 
24th at 2 p.m., then for 6 p.m., then for the 25th at 7 a.m., otherwise martial law will be 
applied in all its rigor. With general consternation, it is now Imre Nagy who is made the 
spokesperson for these ultimata. 
Those do not seem besides to impress anybody if one judges by the corpses and the many 
casualties who, after midday on the 24th, strew the streets and among whom many are 
women. 
However, in an increasingly frequent way, the officers and troops refuse to shoot at the crowd 
and instead fraternize with it. Tanks pass the insurrectionists and, on the 24th in the evening, 
about ten between them take part in guarding Stalin Bridge. Thereafter, their manpower does 
not stop being reinforced. 
Under these conditions, it is inevitable that the initiative of the operations passes quickly to 
the Russian troops. Their tanks and their manpower arrive by the Eastern Railway Station, 
and by the road at a rapid pace, from 2 in the morning. 
They double up and supervise the Hungarian soldiers everywhere and are not long in 
releasing the besieged Soviet embassy. Soon, the streets in the center are damaged by the 
cannon; the museum of Budapest burns, as well as the Astoria hotel. Soviet planes fly over 
the city, but are obstructed by the fog. 
On the 25th, in the morning, the situation appeared almost desperate for the insurrectionists 
and the crowd, who had received the order to go to work, seemed to move around freely 
again. However, the bridges and the crossroads were kept by the Russians. 
But in the morning, the engagements begin again, in particular between Russian and 
Hungarian tanks. At midday, the insurrectionists try to attack the Parliament, but are encircled 
and dispersed by the Soviet tanks. 
However, in other sectors, certain information, which this legation initially refused to put faith 
in, indicates a wavering in the attitude of the Soviets. One of their motorized detachments, 
taken by surprise, is encircled and disarmed by the crowd, which, in particular, seizes two 
tanks under the windows of French Institute. Nobody affirms that under different 
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circumstances, the Russians would have let themselves disarm without resistance or would 
have even voluntarily delivered their equipment. 
At this point of time – on the 25th at 12:30, the radio announces that the Political Committee 
has just relieved Gerö of his functions and that he is to be replaced by Kadar (First secretary 
of the party) and Nagy (president of the Council). 
At 15h20, the radio disperses a call of these two leaders. The first requires the re-
establishment of the order, but promises to start negotiations with the USSR on an equal 
footing. The second guarantees the amnesty for all those who surrender and announces, “in 
his capacity as president of the Council”, that the government is currently in talks with the 
Soviet government “for the withdrawal of the foreign troops”. 
 
 
Document 6 
Report of Mr. Alphand, Ambassador of France in Washington to Mr. Pineau, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs – October 27 1956 
 
CABLE 26  
 
Mr. Alphand, ambassador of France in Washington, 
 to Mr. Pineau, minister of Foreign Affairs 
 
Washington, 27 october 1956, 3h30 
T. n°6737 to 6741. Absolute Priority. Reserved. 
I refer to your n°11528 
 
One of my colleagues had the occasion to discuss on the evening of October 26th with Mr. 
Beam, a possible recourse to the United Nations about the intervention of Soviet troops in 
Hungary. This question had been examined all day between the Secretary of State and his 
principal colleagues. No decision had been made yet by the evening of the 26th, waiting for 
the reaction of countries friendly towards the the United States – which had been consulted 
the very same day. 
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One tends in the present hour to consider in Washington that a request in the United Nations 
should be signed by the greatest possible number of signatories of the peace treaties in 
addition to France.The US government estimates, for its part, that it cannot neither be the only 
signatory of this letter, but nor can it abstain from affixing its signature for the action which 
would be brought forth. Approaches were made in this direction not only in London, but also 
towards the Commonwealth state signatories of the peace treaty. Discretion is left to the 
ambassador of the United States in Yugoslavia in order to judge if it is useful or not to 
approach Marshal Tito on this subject. France would be the only country not a signatory of 
the peace treaties whose participation seems essential. The British have already given a first 
answer to the move taken towards them this morning. They are agreed to take it to the United 
Nations, but reckon that it is possible to wait the moment when the General Assembly will 
meet. The State Department considers it impossible to delay for such a long time and wishes 
to make a decision over the weekend.  
Mr. Foster Dulles has not yet come to a conclusion on whether it would be sufficient for the 
states which are signatories to the letter to ask for registration of the question in the agenda – 
and to draw the attention of international opinion to the gravity of the situation in Hungary 
without putting forward a practical measure. He will have also examined this evening the 
possibility of putting forward a resolution creating a committee of the Council charged to 
supervise the evolution of the events of Budapest. It is quite certain that a resolution of this 
kind would encounter a Soviet veto and perhaps a negative veto or a Yugoslav abstention. 
Nevertheless, the United States believes to be able to count on a solid majority of nine states. 
On no account, a possible recourse to the Security Council would not be based on the 
violation of the peace treaty of 1947. An argument of this kind could be embarrassing if the 
USSR would object to the peace treaty with Italy, signed at the same time, as since then it has 
been greatly modified in its practical application. The State Department thus prefers to base 
its argumentation on the violation of the principles of the Charter and on the declaration of the 
Human rights. Mr. Dillon gave an account today, of the first discussion which he had this 
morning with Your Excellence on this subject. One would wish in Washington to know the 
final position of the French government for tomorrow.  
 
 
Document 7 
Report of Mr. Chauvel, Ambassador of France in London to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – October 27 1956 
 
 
Cable 27  
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Mr. Chauvel, ambassador of France, London, 
 to Mr. Pineau, Minister of the Foreign Affairs  
 
London, 27 October 1956, 14h. 
T. n°5659 to 4664. Absolute priority. Reserved.  
 
On the basis of the information given on the telephone by the chief executive officer of the 
Political Affairs at the Ministry, I questioned yesterday afternoon the permanent under-
secretary about the English provisions concerning the appeal which Hungarian 
insurrectionists had made to the English legation in Budapest. 
Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick assured me of the fact that the English legation had been appealed to by 
the insurrectionists. I comunicated that the legation of the United States appeared to have been 
appealed to too; my interlocutor answered me that he had not received anything from 
Washington on this subject. 
On the follow-up to this call, he was very reserved. The news available to him at that time 
marked the extent of the movement, but one might fear that the insurrection will be quickly 
curbed. In addition, expressions of sympathy, in an acute crisis period, would likely be rather 
badly received by people more interested in effective support being given to them.  
Lastly, the affair did not appear to conveniently conclude – in terms of an appeal to the 
Council. 
For these reasons, the trend of the British government was to hold in reserve the arguments 
which the intervention of the Soviet troops provided us in Hungary, for the case where the 
Russians would attack us later on about actions that circumstances would lead us to undertake 
elsewhere. Without further specification, I had the impression that my interlocutor thought of 
Levant and particularly Jordan. He mentioned at no time the affairs of North Africa.  
This morning, on a received communication of the general secretary of the Ministry, I asked 
to see again the permanent under-secretary of State who called me on the telephone a moment 
ago. It was to tell me that the British government had been greeted yesterday afternoon by an 
American proposal moving towards a joint approach at the Council. 
The Prime Minister had decided to achieve this request, marking however that if this action 
was taken, he would wish that France had to join it.  
Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick added that the news of the morning and the received information of the 
legation from England in Budapest presented the insurrection as being liable to spread. In 
these conditions, it appeared preferable to act right now. As I said to him that we were 
ourselves disposed to join to an approach if the British government took part in it, he added 
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that instructions were going to be sent to Sir Pierson Dixon to ask him to get in touch with his 
French and American colleagues on the terms of a letter to be addressed to the president of the 
Council. The instructions concerning the terms of this letter would be given on a sufficiently 
broad basis to facilitate the common work of the writing.  
 
 
Document 8 
Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Cornut-Gentille, Chief of the 
Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations. – October 27 1956 
 
CABLE 28 
Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs,  
 to Mr. Cornut-Gentille, chief of the permanent mission of France to the United 
Nations.  
 
Paris, 27 October 1956, 21h55. 
T. n° 3283, 3284. Absolute priority. Reserved.  
 
I refer to your telegram n°1998 as well as the telegram from Washington n°6670 which was 
communicated to you under the n°1265. 
I am sending to you, under the following numbers, the text of a preliminary draft of resolution 
of which you will be able to discuss with your American and British colleagues. As you will 
see it, it focuses only on the shipment of weapons carried out by Egypt on the Athos, without 
mentioning previous interferences by this country. 
We indeed have an interest in avoiding as all far as possible a debate on the whole Algerian 
question. That said, it does not exclude that, during your interventions, you evoke at the right 
moment previous interferences by Egypt, notably in the field of propaganda.  
The limited character of our draft resolution should moreover allow us, as your two 
colleagues also think, to more easily defeat the Egyptian counter-plots and to push aside the 
registration, and possibly the discussion, of the counterclaims which the adversary would 
allege to bring to the Council. 
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Lastly, it is essential that the draft is drawn up in its final form in order to rally the biggest 
number of votes.  
 
 
Document 9 
Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to ambassadors of France in London 
and Washington – October 27 1956 
 
CABLE 29 
 
Mr. Pineau, Minister of the Foreign Affairs, 
 to ambassadors of France in London and Washington  
 
Paris, 27 October 1956, 22h25. 
T. n° 11404-11408; 11581-11585.  
 
I refer to the telegram from London n°4634-4635.  
The Ministry estimates that the approach considered in Bonn is likely to be platonic, since it 
does not bring any new element and our position is already known by the government of the 
Federal republic and by the government of Vienna. Under these conditions, it does not seem 
very convenient to go back to the planned memorandum. 
The department has the feeling that only a more constructive attitude, on our part, would be, it 
seems, likely to incite the German and Austrian governments to postpone, for the moment and 
in the interest of the Western solidarity, the dispatch of observers to a forthcoming session of 
the Commission of Budapest. This is why we proposed pentalateral talks on this subject.  
Furthermore, the Department sees only advantages in responding favourably to the American 
and British suggestions to discuss in advance, in discussions between the three, the proposals 
which should be made to the Germans and to the Austrians. In this regard, theMinistry, in 
what relates to it, estimates that these disucssions  should answer the following principle: as 
far as possible to preserve the international character of the river, and to prevent by means of 
their accession to the Commission of Budapest, Germany and Austria, as the only two 
bordering countries which are still apart from the current system, from joining an 
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organization, which of this fact, would constitute a kind of “selected club” from which the 
non-bordering countries would be excluded, whatever, moreover, might be their interests in 
the Danubian navigation. 
On a concrete level, it seems that from these prospects, it would be desirable to start an 
ultimate attempt with the Eastern Bloc countries in order to obtain that the non-bordering 
western powers would be associated, in a form which remains to be determined, with the 
work of the Commission of Budapest, an attempt which, according to the information 
received at the Department, would not be displeasing to certain German circles and especially 
Austrians.  
In practice, during possible negotiations on this problem with the Eastern Bloc countries, the 
various hypotheses envisaged in the report of the tripartite working group, relating to the 
regime of the Danube, on the 19th and 21st September 1955 could be examined again. We 
could, it seems, at the outset present the maximum claims which could consist of a 
fundamental modification of the convention of Belgrade, even to adopt as a last fallback 
position a minimum requirement which would be reduced to the simple sending of an 
observer by an organ of the United Nations, such as the European Economic commission, for 
example.  
The Ministrywould be obliged if these views would be exposed to the government of your 
residence. Request its approval, so that the tripartite conversations envisaged take place at the 
Ministry through representatives of the embassies on the 5th of November. 
 
 
Document 10 
Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Permanent Mission of France 
to the United Nations – October 27 1956 
 
CABLE 31  
Mr. Pineau, Minister of the Foreign Affairs,  
 to the permanent mission of France to the United Nations. 
 
T. n° 3282. Absolute Priority. Secret. Reserved. 
Paris, 27 October 1956, 23h. 
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To be communicated via tape-recording to Mr. Cornut-Gentille.  
It is essential that the draft resolution which will be put before the Security Council on the 
Hungarian question does not contain any provision likely to obstruct our action in Algeria and 
our relations with Morocco and Tunisia. In particular, we are opposed to the creation of a 
commission of inquiry. 
In addition, the resolution will have all the more sway with international opinion and in 
Hungary, and it will be more concise and stripped of worn-out options.  
 
 
Document 11 
Report of Mr. Francis Lacoste, Ambassador of France in Ottawa to Mr. Pineau, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 27 1956 
 
 
CABLE 33 
Mr. Francis Lacoste, ambassador of France in Ottawa,  
 to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Ottawa, 27 October 1956, 20h10. 
T. n° 613-614. Very urgent. 
 
Acting on the instruction of his government, my American colleague yesterday asked the 
foreign minister about his feelings on the opportunity of an intervention of the United Nations 
in the events of Hungary, Mr. Pearson answered him that, in the opinion of the Canadian 
government, the International organization should be concerned with the question very 
urgently, in order to stop the bloodshed. 
In addition, addressing this morning members of the Rotary Club of Toronto, the [thoughts of 
the] foreign minister should be expressed in the following sense: 
« The Canadian government reckons that Hungary should be able to choose its own way. » 
« The world opinion must be mobilized in favor of forces fighting for their national freedom 
and against military intervention or foreign domination. The United Nations constitutes the 
ideal place where such a feeling could be expressed, and the Soviet Union, like any other 
member of the Organization, has the right and the duty to cooperating in finding a solution.» 
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Document 12 
Report of Mr. Fouques-Duparc, Ambassador of France in Rome to Mr. Pineau, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs – October 27 1956 
 
CABLE 34 
Mr. Fouques-Duparc, ambassador of France in Rome, 
 to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Rome, 27 October 1956, 19h. 
T. n°1027,1028. Urgent.  
 
In the spirit of the declarations made yesterday by Mr. Martino, the Chigi palace wishes that 
the West expresses, with the greatest possible radiance, its solidarity with the Hungarian 
people. According to the information given by a close colleague of the General secretary, it is 
considering an action on three plans: 
- Immediate assistance by the sending of relief supplies, drugs, food, through national and 
international committees of the Red Cross; 
- Actions on the European level within the framework of the Council of Europe or the 
Western European Union. 
Mr. Alessandrini received the instruction to inquire today as to the views of the members of 
the Atlantic Pact on this subject. 
- Lastly, the Italian government wishes to be able, in some manner, to join the action of 
the Security Council. 
Mr. Brosio must take a step in this direction in Washington. Other information will be given 
in the days to come on the Italian projects which are inspired by the sympathy that one feels 
here for the cause of the insurrectionists, as at the same time as by the traditional links which 
link Italy and Hungary. 
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Document 13 
Report of M. Paul-Boncourt, Minister of France in Budapest to M. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – October 27 1956 
 
CABLE 36 
Mr. Paul-Boncourt, Minister of France in Budapest,  
 to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Budapest, 27 October 1956. 
T. n°647. Reserved. 
Following my n°643. 
The insurrection is developing in the provinces. The government had, by radio, to accept all 
the conditions of a certain Council of the revolution in Riezolnok, which is a Soviet garrison. 
The workers’ council, approved reluctantly by Nagy yesterdy, are taking over the industrial 
centers.  
In the capital, after one night of combat, the insurrectionists attacked some security police 
stations. Since this morning, a relative calm has reigned. However, the population was 
authorized to seek impossible supply – that is only between 6 a.m. and 10 hours. If they 
continue to travel, it is at their own risk, because the armored cars patrol and are mandated 
from time to time to recall it by shooting.  
The aim pursued could be to exhaust the morale of the population, broached more and more 
by lassitude and deprivations. 
The patriotic fever of these last days is undoubtedly falling and if the current truce were 
prolonged, it is possible that the insurrectionists would not find a great deal of support among 
the population. 
Although the composition of the cabinet of Nagy constituted a disappointment, many wonder 
why the fighting continues – since the chief of the government, or the Central Committee, has 
accepted the major part of the insurrectionists’ claims. Moreover, the leadership had the 
ability to appoint to a particularly capital role at the present time, that of the Commissar of 
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Supply, Vas, a communist, an organizer and a popular personality. He proved his organizing 
qualities as mayor of Budapest from the day following the liberation. 
 
 
 
Document 14 
Report of Mr. De la Tournelle, Ambassador of France in Madrid to Mr. Pineau, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 27 1956 
 
CABLE 37  
Mr. De la Tournelle, ambassador of France in Madrid,  
 to Mr. Pineau, Minister of the Foreign Affairs. 
 
Madrid, 27 October 1956, 20h.  
T. n° 834 to 836.  
 
The Council of Ministers, which met yesterday evening at El Pardo under the presidency of 
the General Franco, has charged the Spanish representative of the UNO to raise, in the name 
of his country, a protest « against the bloody action of the Soviet troops in the internal 
conflicts of Hungary and Poland and by requesting from the international agency its 
intervention ». Such a decision is well in line with the official anticommunist policy of Spain.  
We should however note that Spain intervenes at the time when two officials of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs are semi-officially in Moscow to regulate, in theory, the question relating 
to the return of Spanish emigrants, but rumors has it, that in spite of denials given, other 
subjects are to be approached (such as the restitution of the gold of the Bank of Spain).  
In the same time, Madrid has preserved semi-official relationships with the diplomatic 
missions of the old governments of Central Europe established here: in addition to royal 
legations of Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia,  of Poland and Czechoslovakia they have a 
Croatian representation, and all enjoy many advantages. 
The initiative of the Council of Ministers seems to be taken apart from any consultation of the 
interested Western countries and would tend to mark that Spain wants to act apart from the 
sphere of the Atlantic’s pact. An editorial of the A.B.C. quotes again besides this morning the 
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idea of a Mediterranean pact anticommunist for which Spain and Turkey, which defend the 
entries to Mare Nostrum, should be promoters, and which would help to complete in another 
form « the partial co-operation between the countries of the anticommunist bloc of the 
western world ». 
 
 
 
Document 15 
Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – October 28 1956 
 
CABLE 38 
Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest,  
 to Mr. Pineau, Minister of the Foreign Affairs. 
Budapest, 28 October 1956, 12h42. 
T. n° 648 to 650. Absolute priority. 
 
Prior to the the argumentation that the Soviet delegation undoubtedly prepares itself to 
develop before the Security Council, Radio-Moscow assigns the insurrection of Budapest to 
the “reactionary agents of capitalist powers”.  
Neither Gerö, nor Nagy dared to accuse the western powers, at least publicly: the first spoke 
of « provocative elements » and the second of « counter-revolutionaries groups ». The  
broadcasting of the regime spoke at several times only about « premeditated provocations by 
fascistic reactionaries elements », when it accounted for the interrogation of insurgents taken 
as prisoners. 
It has affirmed that they simply had been fooled by “hooligans” or “pillage professionals”.  
Furthermore, any pejorative description was, relatively speaking, abandoned by the third day 
of the rising, to be partially resumed only at the start of the expiry of the ultimata. When the 
crews of the Soviet tanks fraternized with the crowd who overwhelmed them on October 25th 
and walked with them around midday outside the palace of the Parliament of…45 the arsenals, 
who was the « provocative » element?  
                                                             
45 Gap of decryption. 
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And who caused the general strike of the…46 workers in all the country as well as the 
appropriation of the factories by the trade unions, elements which one believed faithful to the 
regime? The only Western factor having given some moral support to the rioters was Radio 
Free Europe. Still, it was generally limited to applauding them without encouraging them too 
much to continue the fight. In addition now they hold out for the Anglo-Franco-American 
appeal to the U.N.  
 
 
Document 16 
Report of Mr. François Seydoux, Ambassador of France in Vienna to Mr. Pineau, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 28 1956 
 
CABLE 39 
Mr. François Seydoux, Ambassador of France in Vienna,  
 to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
Vienna, 28 October 1956, 15h25 
T. n° 535. Absolute priority.  
 
I refer to my telegram n°532. 
 
Mr. Figl indicated to us that, according to the information which he has laid out, the Soviet 
reinforcements in tanks and aviation will be entering into Hungary from Romania and the 
USSR or transiting through Czechoslovakia. There will be three armies representing a total of 
twenty-seven divisions. 
 
 
Document 17 
Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Cornut-Gentille, Chief of the 
Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations – October 28 1956 
                                                             
46 Gap of decryption 
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CABLE 41 
 
Mr. Pineau, Minister of the Foreign Affairs,  
 to Mr. Cornut-Gentille, chief of the permanent mission of France to the United 
Nations.  
Paris, 28 October 1956, 16h10. 
T. n° 3335-3336. Absolute Priority.  
 
Our ambassador in Vienna had a call this afternoon with the general secretary of the Ministry.  
Mr Figl wished to notify him, and to inform also his American and British colleagues, that he 
just had asked Moscow that a ceasefire took place in the engagements between the Hungarian 
insurrectionists and the Soviet troops. The Austrian government also informed the secretary 
general of the U.N of its initiative. 
This action has the support of the Austrian public opinion which, as far as possible, expresses 
its active sympathy (drugs and help) for the Hungarians. This is all the more important in the 
eyes of the Austrians that, according to the information they have given to Mr. Seydoux, three 
Soviet armies would go on Hungary.  
 
 
Document 18 
Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Cornut-Gentille, Chief of the 
Permanent Mission of France to the United Nation – October 28 1956 
 
CABLE 42 
Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
 to Mr. Cornut-Gentille, chief of the permanent mission of France to the United Nation.  
T. n° 3326,3327. Absolute priority. Reserved.  
Paris, 28 October 1956, 16h20.  
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Referring to my former telegram relating to the draft Resolution intended to be put before the 
Security Council on the Hungarian question, I communicate to you with the following 
numbers a text mentioning certain topics which could be included in the project. They are 
simple suggestions which I transmit to you, purely for reference, for your discussions with 
your American and British colleagues. 
There is no reference there to the violations of human rights. Maybe there are, ultimately, 
more disadvantages than advantages to retain this concept which is invoked against us in the 
Algerian affair and against the British in the affair of Cyprus; it would be likely to cause the 
debate to deviate and to open up the way for annoying and useless polemics.  
 
 
Document 19 
Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Cornut-Gentille, Chief of the 
Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations – October 29 1956 
 
CABLE 44 
Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
 to Mr. Cornut-Gentille, chief of the permanent mission of France to the Organization 
of the United Nations.  
T. n° 3330 to 3334. Absolute priority.  
Paris, 29 October 1956, 16h 
In the current circumstances and since we are not signatory of the Hungarian treaty, you 
would have interest to direct your intervention according to the following lines:  
a. We claim by no means to get involve in the interior affairs of a country. We note, on the 
contrary, that the incursion has been made by a foreign state. 
b. It is useless to claim that the Soviet troops should intervene under the treaty of Warsaw. It 
does not envisage in any of its clauses an action of this nature. 
c. If one affirms on the Soviet side that it was simply a question for the Soviet army of 
defending its lines of communication in Hungary, you will point out that we are witnessing, 
not defensive actions, but a mass intervention, and the prolongation of this alone led to the 
current tragedy.  
d. If, on the Soviet side, one declares that the intervention occurred at the request of Nagy’s 
government, you will take note of this declaration while pointing out that, according to certain 
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information, the intervention occurred on the night of October 23rd, before even the 
constitution of this government, whose legal authority does not seem, besides, to have been 
shown, and which, in addition, same government has promised the insurrectionists to seek the 
departure of the Soviet troops of Hungary before January 1st, 1957. 
e. You will insist, finally and especially, on the need to stop without delay the bloodshed, to 
allow supply to the population, and to restore the sovereignty of the Hungarian people. 
f. If, on the Soviet side, one would claim that the insurrection was fomented by « imperialist » 
agents, you would leave it to your American colleague to refute these allegations. You would 
restrict yourselves to point out that it is about a generalized popular rising which Szabad Nep, 
an organ of the Hungarian Communist party, itself recognized on 26th October that it was due 
to the errors of the past and « the resentment » of the working class.  
g. I cannot judge from here whether it would be beneficial to propose an immediate 
suspension of weapons, and the meeting before the Council of a representative of the 
Hungarian government who would come to make a statement on the real situation. This 
suggestion, which would avoid any recourse to a Committee of inquiry, to which we are 
unfavorable, could, in any case, bring immediate relief to the population. 
 
 
Document 20 
Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – October 29 1956 
 
CABLE 45 
Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest,  
 to Mr. PIneau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.  
T. n° 663,664.  
Budapest, 29 October 1956, 15h46, 16h. 2.  
 
Having been to see the enrolment of the students into the national guard (my telegram n° 
655), the military attaché collected the following intelligence close to the revolutionary 
committee of intellectuals, which was to sit in the recruitment’s buildings, and which 
comprised outstanding personalities majority of which were known of him and some of 
myself. 
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1. The governmental declaration of yesterday gives satisfaction to the essential claims of the 
insurrectionists. 
2. The foundation of the national guard confirms the complete dissolution of the political 
security police. 
3. Although certain members of the Nagy cabinet do not profit from popular sympathies, the 
new president of the Council is regarded as the key man of the situation and the only 
personality able to restore order in the country.  
4. The Committee was aware of the declarations of our representative at the Security Council 
and was sensitive to the tone of conciliation of this speech « which is in the French diplomatic 
tradition of mediation between the Soviet block and certain extreme trends, that are 
occasionally expressed in one or another ally of France ».  
 
 
Document 21 
Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – October 29 1956 
 
CABLE 46 
Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest,  
 to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
T. n° 665,666. Urgent.  
Budapest, 29 October 1956, 18h. 9. 
 
For the first time, maybe, since its foundation, Szabad Nep argued against Pravda in 
connection with a particular article titled: “The collapse of an adventure directed against the 
Hungarian people”. 
«It is a [purification], declares the official journal of the Hungarian Communist party, it was 
not an adventure. Finally, patriotic ideas won out and not those of the reaction or the counter-
revolution. One does not want to live here in fear and terror anymore, one wants more goods; 
here is the adventure against the Hungarian people. This article wounds and offends the 
population of Budapest. Its fight was not caused by imperialist agents, but by despair. What 
do the people of Hungary want? National independence is its first requirement». «That 
Hungary is a free and an independent country».  
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Document 22 
Report of Mr. Des Garets, Chargé d’Affaires of France in Belgrade to Mr. Pineau, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 29 1956 
 
CABLE 48 
Mr. Des Garets, chargé d’affaires of France in Belgrade, 
 to Mr. Pineau, minister of Foreign Affairs. 
T. n°914 to 917. 
Belgrade, 29 October 1956, 19h. 
 
I have visited the new director of Western Europe this morning.  
Mr. Zemijak pointed out that the Hungarian crisis came from slownesses with which 
democratization had been carried out. Due to a lack of an evolution in good time, they had a 
revolution. 
One can reason, however, as he continued, that the new governmental program, which makes 
broad concessions at the requests of the insurrectionists, will make it possible to restore peace 
and to establish « something solid ». 
Concerning Mr. Nagy, his popularity depends, undoubtedly, mainly, on the departure of the 
Soviet troops. It seems beside the point that that the intervention of these troops was required, 
not by Nagy, but by Gerö. The latter precipitated the crisis by his blunders. 
My interlocutor admitted that Hungary had been much further way than Poland in the way of 
« Liberalization ». 
He reckons that there is lack in Hungary of a key figure like that in Poland, with Mr. 
Gomulka, in who is exalted in his role. 
The director of Western Europe spontaneously spoke to me about the « sensitive » situation in 
his country yesterday at the Security Council. « Undoubtedly, we do not tolerate the Soviet 
interventions. They are contrary with our principles. But, at the same time, we must take 
account of a set of elements. Our situation will be also extremely delicate during the 
discussion on the underlying problem. In any case, the Hungarian rising represents a serious 
failure for the USSR; this failure reached, not only stalinists, but also current leaders. It is an 
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event of a considerable importance, as important as the attitude of Yugoslavia in 1948 and, 
besides, of a similar nature: it is a… with the Soviet seizure. We do not know what will be the 
reaction of the USSR, but we hope — and the attitude that it has adopted with respect to 
Poland can, undoubtedly, confirm this hope — that it will be also able to take heed of 
Hungarian realities ».  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Document 23 
Report of Mr. De Boisanger, Ambassador of France in Prague to Mr. Pineau, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs – October 29 1956 
 
CABLE 49 
Mr. De Boisanger, ambassador of France in Prague,  
 to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
T. n° 1106 to 1109. Urgent. Reserved. 
Prague, 29 October 1956, 19h.  
 
The more one measures the importance of the events in Poland and Hungary, the more one 
thinks that they could not have any consequences in Czechoslovakia. Without any doubt the 
situation of the country is very different from that of its neighbors. The standard of living of 
the inhabitants has not stopped improving for two years. Police despotism has been noticeably 
reduced and people have ceased to live in fear of arbitrary arrests. A series of liberal 
measurements or of practices — because destalinization, to be implemented stealthily, is 
noting less than a reality — made the regime less tyrannical, less troublesome, and has 
allowed the recovery, the increase in contacts with the West. Communism remains however 
abhorred by a majority of the population, not less than how they are shocked by the 
subordination of the authorities to the policy of Moscow. 
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The government cannot ignore this state of mind and the encouragement which the upheavals 
which occur in Poland and Hungary will give to the opposition. How will it react? Some of 
my colleagues, with the safety measures which have been taken over the past few days, 
believe in a hardening of policy. It is not my opinion. 
Considering the careful temperament of the Czechs, I would rather incline to believe that the 
government, sensitive to the lessons of these last weeks, will endeavor to make remedy some 
of the subjects of the current climate of dissatisfaction. 
But the evolution of Czechoslovakia as well as the evolution of the other countries of people's 
democracy also depends on another factor: the attitude of the western powers. One knows 
which party the Czechoslovakian government draws on with respect to the population, 
attached to certain advantages that the regime brought to it, attitudes or facts which could 
suggest that the re-establishment of the regime abolished in 1948 is the objective of the 
Western policy. 
Isn’t this the moment to definitively dissipate this ambiguity? A solemn proclamation of the 
principles which inspire the policy of France, of Great Britain, of the United States with 
respect to the people's democracies could have here, in the current circumstances, deep echoes 
– namely that they do not intend to support any shape of government, and that the choice of 
the regime to which a country wishes to be submitted to belongs only to the population 
without any external intervention. It would logically follow the debate that has just taken 
place at the Security Council.  
 
Document 24 
Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – October 29 1956 
 
CABLE 53 
Mr Paul-Boncour, Minister of France at Budapest 
To Mr Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
D N°1024                                                                                      Budapest, 29 October 1956 
 
The calls of Nagy and Kadar did not bring about the cessation of the resistance in Budapest 
and did not stop its extension to Transdanubia. 
And yet, in Budapest, the resistance became more and more difficult. If on the morning of the 
26th, violent fights still occurred in the East and North of the Capital, and in the evening the  
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insurgents still managed to burn two tanks and one Russian armoured car with gas-cans; on 
the 27th, it is flat calm excepted a few isolated gunshots. Empty streets are kept everywhere 
by Soviet tanks. Hungarian troops were ordered by the government to withdraw into three 
barracks in the city but one part may have disappeared. 
Anyway, to occupy Budapest by force, the Russian commander had to call on the closest 
troops, which are those in Transdanubia, between Budapest and the Austrian border, and 
which were rallied to the capital between 24th and 25th October. It was only on the 26th, 27th 
and 28th that the troops from the East arrived. 
Therefore, Transdanubia was largely emptied of Russian troops and rapidly rose up. On the 
27th at Gyor; on the 28th at Vac, Szolnok and Hatvan, they fell into the hands of  insurgents. 
On the night between the 27th and 28th, at the post of Hegyeshalom, the police, guards and 
troops were rallied to the resistance, opening thus a breach in the Austro-Hungarian border. 
On the morning of the 28th, it was announced that a school of tanks in Pata had done the same 
thing. Hence, we can say today, as far as our information from the province is exact, that 
Hungary is cut by a line determined by the bend of the Danube. 
In this first phase, what are the government reactions? 
On 27 October at 11:20, Nagy announced the composition of his government which mainly 
include communists and could have been conceivable before the 23 October. We can say 
therefore that most of the ministers were recruited among the non-Stalinists, opportunists and 
those who have been rehabilitated. Exceptions are the Minister of Agriculture, Bela Kovacs 
and the Minister of Finance, Istvan Kossa, former members of the smallholders’s party. 
My communications indicated to the Ministry that the composition of the Political Committee 
and the Central Committee has hardly changed. The men are the same, except the two chiefs 
of the executive and the party. 
Admittedly, the situation is such that, at least in its declarations, this government is ready to 
make huge concessions. The first one is the departure of the Russians (and Nagy expressed 
his readiness to ask for the departure of Russian troops), but there is no reason today to claim 
that the U.S.S.R is willing to withdraw the troops. My communication on 28th October 
reported of the other concessions in foreign policy. A series of promises genuinely demagogic 
on internal and social policies was added and most of them were naturally, impossible to 
implement in the foreseeable future. One considers the right to work, the various conditions of 
the men of 1848, and the government of the second Republic. Nevertheless, it is indisputable 
that Kadar-Nagy team is striving to tangibly satisfy opinion: 
1° The tone of the official press has changed considerably. In its editorial, Szabad Nep, on the 
28th affirmed that “we do not recognize a fascist nature to the insurrection”. This is a popular 
movement gathering workers, peasants and intellectuals. Here is what a great number of 
communists did not understand… Gero’s speech played a fatal role. 
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2° Hungarian troops receive a general order to cease fire, except if they are attacked. It is true 
that the loyalty of these troops was more and more precarious. 
3° The A.V.O (political police) has been abolished and will be replaced by a new state police, 
with a new composition (28 October).  
In particular, a security service will be implanted in the capital (Nagy’s speech on 28 October) 
gathering elements of the army, police and student and workers militias. 
4°The government managed to get the Russian troops to begin to evacuate the capital in such 
a manner that the evacuation would be complete by the time the security service is organized. 
These concessions are determined by the split in the country and the threatening attitude of 
the workers (conditions of the factory in Gyor, and from the workers of oil wells in Zala) but 
the formulation of the speeches (Nagy’s speech attached) are still expressed in a communist 
phraseology. 
In the current confusion, it is still too early to put forward conclusions that could be ventured. 
It is clear that the country is split in two parts and the question arises of whether the part of 
Hungary that rose up will be regained or not by the Russians. If not, we will be witness to a 
game of demands from the revolutionaries, as is already occurring at the present time. It is 
questionable whether it is possible to reach an agreement between the conditions put forward 
and the minimum acceptable for the Hungarian government, for the U.S.S.R, and, let us not 
forget, for the Yugoslavians. 
The mass of the people seems to expect a lot from Yugoslavia: in particular on the 25th, a 
crowd en masse came outside the Yugoslavian embassyshouting: “help us, help us!”. But as 
of now, it is probable that the demands of liberated regions seem to exceed in a liberal way 
the Titoist conceptions of socialism. Concerning the Russians, different witnesses noticed 
their dismayed attitude and sometimes an unusual flabbiness in the repression made by their 
troops and a few cases of surrender. But it is obvious that we cannot draw general conclusions 
on the future attitude of Moscow. 
One fact stays certain, the U.S.S.R. can no longer rely on an efficient local power in Hungary 
except if it resigns itself to give wide concessions, the most crucial of which is the evacuation 
of the troops. If the U.S.S.R. consents, nobody can predict how the regime will evolve. If the 
U.S.S.R. refuses, at this stage of public opinion, it is probable that it is destined to the 
governmental vacuum and the military administration. 
 
 
Document 25 
Report of Mr. Soutou, Chargé d’Affaires of France in Moscow to Mr. Pineau, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs – October 30 1956 
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CABLE 55 
Mr Soutou, Chargé d’Affaires of France at Moscow, 
To Mr Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
T.n°4269 to 4275. Reserved                                              Moscow, 30 October 1956, 19h. 40. 
 
During a few receptions of yesterday, the Soviets leaders displayed exuberance and joviality 
aimed at trying to show that they are free of any concerns. The consumed alcohol fostering 
their attitude, they multiplied jokes wich did not make much sense, but which were 
inappropriate in the context of the events in Hungary. 
Mr Khrushchev and Mr Bulganin avoided all discussion on the events of Poland and Hungary. 
Mr Bohlen after a vain effort to leave them from their reservation, had to fall back on the 
marshal Zhukov who said a few noteworthy statements even though he is also very discreet. 
According to the leader of the Soviet army, Moscow was very reluctant to put its troops at the 
service of the government of Budapest. To support his statements, Marshal Zhukov quoted, as 
an example, the attitude of the U.S.S.R during the Polish crisis. He said that a massive 
intervention of the Soviet army may have been possible within a few hours and the 
“arrangement may have been sufficient to squash them like a bug. But I sent Marshal Koniev 
[to Poland] to make sure that the local commanders would not take any initiative and avoid 
intervening. The same attitude may have been adopted in Hungary if the Hungarian 
government had not called on the U.S.S.R., under the Treaty of Warsaw.” 
As he was immediately asked what dispositions of the treaty he refers to, he limited himself to 
state that the Warsaw organization is not only aimed at the defence of the member states but 
also socialism. 
Concerning the potential withdrawal of the troops from Hungary, the Marshal Zhukov 
remained vague. He simply said, as did Mr Chepilov, that Soviet troops would leave Budapest 
for their usual bases as soon as the calm would be restored. Regarding the evacuation of the 
Hungarian territory, it is the field of competence of the Council of Warsaw organization and 
not of the U.S.S.R only. 
We can feel that the Soviet leaders here are divided on this topic and on another. Those who 
were against the evacuation of Austria, as Mr Molotov, doubtlessly tend today to request the 
cessation of risky concession and improvisations. They are proponents of inertia, while 
Khrushchev is in favour of movement and spontaneity. It is perhaps due to their influence that 
was published a quote of a sentence of Ordzhonikidze in the Pravda of 28 on “the revolution 
which is not a joke” and the danger of destroying the party. However, another would be ready 
to draw the consequences from the current events and to take sides in the spirit of the 
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resolutions of the 20th Congress, which admit a sort of primacy of persuasion, of seduction, 
over simple violence. They still believe that the new policy opened “magnificent doors for 
communism” whereas the others, like Stalin [at the time], mainly trust on the presence of the 
Red army to maintain the communist order in peoples’democracies. 
 
 
Document 26 
Report of Mr François Seydoux, Ambassador of France in Vienna to Mr. Pineau, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 30 1956 
 
CABLE 57 
Mr François Seydoux, Ambassador of France at Vienna 
To Mr Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
T. N°s 563 to 566. Urgent                                                                    Vienna, 30 October 1956, 
21:05 
Mr Turbet-Delof, cultural attaché of our legation to Budapest, arrived at Vienna at 4pm. At 
the request of Mr Paul-Boncour, on his way he contacted the population and the local 
revolutionary authorities. 
He provided us these following pieces of information: 
1°A few units of Soviet armoured cars began to enter into Budapest on the 23rd October. 
They received important reinforcements of tanks on the night between the 26th and the 27th. 
On the 30th, at noon, the bulk of forces gathered at Pest and occupied the strategic places, in 
particular on the Danube.  And yet, Buda, seemed evacuated – apart from some “safety caps” 
that were placed on the roads on the outskirts of the city. A few cases of fraternization 
between Soviet soldiers and the Hungarian population occurred in the morning of the 25. 
2°In Western Hungary it is quiet, military speaking. The Russian garrisons and the Hungarian 
troops seem to monitor each other. 
3° The general strike is observed throughout the Western part of Hungary. Workers, 
kolkhozians, railway workers and students would unanimously decide to return to work only 
when the Russian troops leave the country. 
4° We can in the same region distinguish three trends in the attitude of the population towards 
the government (whose the reshuffle has just been announced) formed on the 27 October: 
- Conditional loyalism in the army, 
56 
 
- A wait and see attitude among a part of the workers, 
- Hostility among the majority, who demand the departure not only of the Russians but also 
the communists. 
5° The administration of Western Hungary is controlled by workers councils and municipal 
revolutionary councils, where communist elements are still present. The population is 
generally hostile to this second category of authority body. 
A meeting of delegates of all committees and councils should be held at Gyor tonight at 4 pm 
to decide whether to keep the current provisional organization; to suppress the most unpopular 
communist elements in these organizations; or to form a rival government to the one in 
Budapest. 
According to public rumour at Gyor, Mr Zoltan Burian could take the lead. 
 
 
 
 
 
Document 27 
Report of Mr. Des Garets, Chargé d’Affaires of France in Belgrade to Mr. Pineau, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 30 1956 
 
CABLE 60 
Mr des Garets, Chargé d’Affaires of France at Belgrade 
To Mr Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
T. n°924 to 927.                                                                                      Belgrade, 30 October 
1956, 6pm 
 
This morning the Austrian ambassador reported to me the terms of a conversation held 
yesterday with Mr Prica. 
The comments of the Under-secretary of State for Foreign Affairs confirmed those made by 
the director for Western Europe (my O.T n°914). 
And yet, Mr Prica would have specified the following points: 
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1° we are “actively committed” to ending the fighting in Hungary. 
2° We abstained in the Security Council so as not to aggravate the situation. Nevertheless, if 
the case is discussed “we would oppose the Soviet intervention”. 
We rely on Nagy’s government to bring normalisation to the situation in Hungary because the 
programme of this government is in accord with the demands of local committees on most of 
the issues. Mr Wodak inferred from Mr Prica’s statements that the leaders of Belgrade entered 
into negotiations with Moscow on the Hungarian issue. 
For the Austria’s Ambassador, the Yugoslavs pursue two objectives: on the one hand, to save 
the Hungarian socialist regime, and on the other hand, to substitute in this country the 
faltering Russian influence with a Yugoslav one, perhaps with the agreement of Moscow. 
The realisation of such a scheme could permit the evasion of the revolution that occurs in 
Hungary. That is where the danger is all the more present for the Occident said Mr Wodak, 
since the conditions that permitted the riots of Budapest, Berlin, and Poznan (tacit approval of 
authorities to the first demonstration) would never happen in the future and a defeat of the 
Hungarian Liberals would discourage all similar efforts in the other satellite countries. 
 
 
Document 28 
Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – October 31 1956 
 
CABLE 69 
Mr Paul-Boncour, Minister of France at Budapest 
To Mr Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
T. n°669 to 673                                                                                         Budapest, 31 October 
1956, 8h. 50, 6h. 5, 6h. 20. 
 
Closely surrounding Budapest and keeping in the centre only a security safeguard for their 
embassy, for their communications and for the government, the Russians strive to hide their 
military control of the capital; but some conflicts occur, like this afternoon during the attack 
on the headquarters of the communist party, as the result of which a correspondent of the 
Paris-Match newspaper was severely injured. The government is unable to bring order other 
than by displaying the Hungarian colours on Soviet tanks. 
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The complete evacuation promised to the population is subordinated by the Russians to the 
restoration of order whereas, the restoration of order in people’s minds is obviously linked to 
the disappearance of Soviet soldiers. 
Certainly, the truce of the past days has been kept as best they could today, but the population 
is visibly in turmoil: the regime’s newspapers had been looted and burnt in public as soon as 
they were published this morning; the government’s authority is openlyscorned and Imre 
Nagy and his team are highly criticised by their own policemen. What we can see concerning 
the National Guard in training is that it can inspire confidence to neither the authorities nor to 
the population. Secret committees are forming almost everywhere, particularly in the factories 
where the workers subordinate their return to work to the effective departure of the Russians. 
The collusion of all of these revolutionary organizations with the province is going to happen. 
Concerning the rest of the country, and particularly its western part – evacuated by the Soviet 
army – the government endeavours to make people believe that the national unity is protected 
under its auspices, without much success. In reality, the terms of its statements indicate how 
the local revolutionary committees subordinate their rallying to conditions less than 
acceptable, in particular concerning the elimination of one part of the communist members of 
the government. And yet, there was only one resignation, of the minister of Communications, 
Bebritz, who had already served in Rakosi’s government. Tonight, Imre Nagy tries to give 
satisfaction by creating in his government one restricted cabinet comprising himself, Kadar, 
former  President of the Republic, Zoltan Tildy, former  from the Smallholders’ Party, Bela 
[Kovacs], [Ferenc] Erdei, [Lo]sonczi and one socialist, who will be appointed by the Social 
Democrats, but once again, a secret leaflet demands the resignation of the whole government. 
 
 
Document 29 
Report of Mr. Francois Seydoux, Ambassador of France in Vienna to Mr. Pineau, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs – October 31 1956 
 
CABLE 73 
Mr. Francois Seydoux, Ambassador of France in Vienna, 
To Mr. Pineau, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
T. n°580 to 582 
Vienna, October 31st, 1956, 9 pm. 
(Received: 9.10 pm) 
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As a result of the news about Hungary obtained last night, I was told today, at Ballhausplatz, 
that some optimism followed the apprehension that there had been during the previous days of 
seeing the insurgency fall into “deterioration”.  
Mr. Kreisky  specified to me this afternoon that the departure of Soviet troops from Budapest 
wouldn't have meaning if it were not followed by the complete evacuation of Hungary. It 
would be, in effect, to fear that the USSR tries to buy time in order to return with force at the 
right time. 
On the other hand, the secretary of state, back on ideas that he had exposed yesterday (my 
telegram n° 571 to 573) has insisted on the decisive interest that aims for a fast initiative of 
the Western powers, if they do not want to miss the "battle of Hungary". In this regard, he 
alluded to the creation by the United Nations of a commission that would check on the spot 
the realisation of commitments, as well as an economic assistance organized in the framework 
of OEEC. Formulating the latter suggestion, which obviously needs to be accurate, Mr. 
Kreisky wanted to emphasize the role that Europe must play in this context and he mentioned 
France. 
 
 
Document 30 
Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Cornut-Gentille, Head of the 
Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations – October 31 1956 
 
CABLE 76 
Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs,  
      To Mr. Cornut-Gentille, Head of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations.  
T. n°3421 à 3423                                                             Paris, 31 October 1956, 22h. 50.  
Absolute priority. Retained.  
 
 
The case of Suez risks, if we are not careful, eclipsing the Hungarian affair. It is important to 
avoid such a state of things that would play into the hands of our adversariesand which could 
also give the public the feeling that the Council is disinterested in the situation of Hungary. 
Without a doubt, the turn of events that seems to have been taken must encourage us to be 
cautious in order to avoid anything that could jeopardize this development. However, at the 
present stage, the Council should not be limited only to the examination of the political 
situation in Hungary nor to statements made since the beginning of the insurrection, but it 
should also address the humanitarian aspects of the issue and, in particular, on measures to be 
taken to assist the population. 
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It seems, therefore, that the discussion of a provisional resolution such as that suggested by 
Great Britain could be useful and take several sessions. This resolution could be completed by 
provisions that would draw inspiration from the fourth and fifth paragraphs of the American 
draft which, moreover, is not acceptable to us, particularly in its second paragraph.  
Finally, if the Council decides to convene an emergency special session of the   General 
Assembly on the Suez issue, you should not miss it, agree with your British and American 
colleagues, to ask the Council to bring the Hungarian question in front of the same assembly. 
 
 
Document 31 
Report of Mr. Jouve, Ambassador of France in Helsinki to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – October 31 1956 
 
CABLE 81 
Mr. Jouve, Ambassador of France in Helsinki,  
    To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.  
 
T. n°69.                                                                          Helsinki, 31 October 1956. 
                                                                                       (Received: 3 November, 17 h.) 
 
 
 
The Chargé d’affaires of the United States yesterday made an approach to the Finnish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the basis of the following memorandum and, moreover, 
without having received precise instruction to make an intervention.  
“1° The American, British and French governments jointly requested that the case of Hungary 
be placed on the agenda of the Security Council”.  
“2° On this occasion, the three governments have invoked that foreign military forces had 
violently repressed the rights of the Hungarian people granted to it by the Peace Treaty As we 
know, the application of article 34 of the Charter of the United Nations was requested in the 
Security Council. The various possibilities of action within that organisation are at present 
under consideration. 
“3° In view of the urgency, it was not possible to consult beforehand your government”.  
“4° The government of the United States thinks that other governments will want to join the 
tripartite initiative. The foregoing has been brought to your attention for this purpose”. 
 
The Chargé d’affaires of the United States, who came to see me before this approach, 
considered that it was advisable to show to the Finnish leaders that the special position of 
their country didn’t dispense them automatically of any gesture of solidarity, even if that 
would be a shock to Moscow. Without deceiving myself about the practical scope of this 
intervention, I consider that the intention which animates it can only be favourable. It is 
important to note here, every time a favourable opportunity appears, that the West doesn’t 
consider Finland as a country irredeemably subservient, by virtue of its commitments and its 
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geographical location, to the Soviet system. On the contrary, without requiring the Finns to 
take positions which would put them in arrow against Moscow, it is good to associate with 
them, as much as possible, on Western initiatives. The events in Hungary provide this 
opportunity.  
As was to be expected, the approach of the Chargé d’affaires embarrassed his interlocutor, 
who made him content by assuring him that the appropriate authorities would be informed of 
the position adopted by the three governments who raised the Hungarian problem before the 
Security Council.  
 
Document 32 
Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Cornut-Gentille, Head of 
Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations – November 1 1956 
 
CABLE 84 
Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
To Mr. Cornut-Gentille, Head of Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations. 
T. n° 3456. Absolute  priority. 
Reserved.  
Paris, November 1st, 1956, 9.50 pm 
 
According to information from Radio-Budapest, Mr. Nagy has requested the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops from Hungary, denounced the Warsaw Pact and proclaimed Hungary's 
neutrality. He requests that the Hungarian issue is brought before the UN General Assembly, 
from which he want to get help.  
You will ask for the inclusion of this item on the agenda of the special session in accordance 
with the procedure provided by art. 19 of the regulation. In case of voting, you will ask that 
we proceed by roll call. 
 
 
Document 33 
Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – November 2 1956 
62 
 
 
CABLE 89 
Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest, 
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
T. n. 682 to 686.      Budapest, November 2, 1956. 7h. 1. 
 
The internal situation is without major changes in relation to yesterday, both in terms of 
population nervousness (looting and burning of libraries, schools), and in the dealingsbetween 
Imre Nagy and several parties or revolutionary factions. The day passed without knowing 
what changes the Prime Minister will make to the composition of his cabinet; in the 
meantime, it's the reorganized Cabinet, as reported in my telegram n° 669, that has prudently 
given him the task of Foreign Affairs. Opinions also differ on the issue if Imre Nagy and 
Kadar will figure in future government. In any case, the majority of current communist 
Ministers will either be excluded or will be temporarily ...47 The evolution towards the right is 
extremely clear, I would say almost radical. Yesterday I reported some favorable factors for 
the government of Imre Nagy. On the contrary, I have to report on one side the first signs of 
intervention in the west of the country to the capital of Hungarian emigrants’ organizations 
and, on the other side, the persistence of a general strike that ... 48 an economic disaster that 
risks to exacerbate people in the short term.  
This, in my opinion, explains largely why, for the international plan, Imre Nagy suddenly 
gives nowadays the most meaningful satisfaction to two essential claims of labor tradeunions 
and of countless revolutionary committees, the first of which is that of Gyor, which is called 
from October 30 revolutionary Committee of Transdanubia. That this is a way to obtain the 
Soviet military evacuation from the country or to break free from the Warsaw Pact to adopt a 
policy of neutrality, the Prime Minister continues to play it all. The radio has just reported at 
the same time the communication made for this dual purpose by Imre Nagy to the Soviet 
ambassador, and the essence of the note is going to be summarized by phonecall to our 
ambassador in Vienna, in order to carry out a retransmission to the Ministry. I must point out 
that this last text, in which there is among other things the proclamation of neutrality of 
Hungury, was presented to the Legation of Yugoslavia at the same time to that of the three 
Western powers.  
We are ignorant as to whether Russian reinforcements have actually entered in Hungary for 
purposes other than the change of the troops who participated in heavy fighting last week; we 
know only that some of these forces, who evacuated the capital yesterday, are entrenched on 
its eastern border, occupying the airport especially. The appointment of another member of 
                                                             
47 Decryption gap. 
48 Decryption gap 
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the Revolutionary Committee of Honved as commander of the external defense of the capital 
revealed, this morning, the military concerns of the government towards the East. 
 
 
Document 34 
Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – November 2 1956 
 
CABLE 90 
Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest, 
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
T. n. 687.       Budapest, November 2, 1956 
(Received: 12.20 am)  
 
I forward now to the Department the full text of the note verbale that I received last night 
from the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs.  
"The Prime Minister of the Hungarian People's Republic, provisionally responsible for the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has the honor of providing the following facts to His Excellency: 
“Some genuine news have been presented to the Government of the Hungarian People's 
Republic, according to which new Soviet military units entered the territory of Hungary. The 
Prime Minister, as minister responsible for Foreign Affairs, received in this regard M. 
Andropov, the Soviet Union's ambassador in Hungary, and categorically protested against the 
entry of new Soviet troops into Hungary. He demanded the immediate and unconditional 
withdrawal of these troops. He said to the Soviet ambassador that the Hungarian government 
was to immediately rescind the Warsaw Pact, proclaimed Hungary's neutrality at the same 
time, address the the United Nations – and to defend the neutrality of the country he requests 
the assistance of the four great powers.  
“The Soviet ambassador has taken note of the communication and the protest of the Prime 
Minister, responsible for Foreign Affairs, and he promised to demand an immediate response 
from his government”. 
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Document 35 
Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Permanent Mission of France 
to the United Nations. – November 2 1956 
 
CABLE 91 
Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
To the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations. 
T. n°3469-3470. 
Absolute priority. Reserved.  
Paris, November 2nd, 1956, 2.25 pm. 
 
I learned that the Security Council will be convened on 2nd or 3rd November to continue the 
examination of the Hungarian issue.  
On the basis of Nagy government statement (The telegram of Vienne n°559) you will ask that 
this meeting takes place today and in the shortest possible time. 
By doing so, you respond to the concern that I have expressed several times since yesterday 
(Telegrams n°3421 and 3456, telephone conversation of Secretary General [of the Ministry] 
with Mr. Cornut-Gentille in the afternoon of Novembre 1st) that this issue is ignored while all 
the attention of the UN is back towards the Israeli-Egyptian question. 
I will communicate by a separate telegram a preliminary draft resolution to the point where 
you will want, certainly, to consult with your American and British colleagues as well as with 
the representatives of those allied countries which have supported our initiative at the Security 
Council or demonstrated an intention to join us. 
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Document 36 
Note of the sub-directorate of Eastern Europe.The situation in Hungary. The new 
"restricted Cabinet" –November 2 1956 
 
CABLE 94 
Note of the sub-directorate of Eastern Europe. 
The situation in Hungary. The new "restricted Cabinet" 
Paris, November 2nd, 1956. 
 
Imre Nagy, the prime minister of the government reorganized on October 27th, and Z. Tildy, 
president of the smallholders’ party, Minister of State, announced on Radio Budapest, on 
October 31st, the establishment, within the government, of a “restricted Cabinet” , composed 
of representatives of different Hungarian democratic parties.  
The Hungarian Government, according to the formula of October 27th, included a majority of 
national Communists and some non-communist personalities: Z. Tildy, rehabilitated even 
before the fall of Gero and called by the latter to cooperate with the C.P. within the 
"Democratic People's Front", and Bela Kovacs, member, as Tildy, of the Smallholders’ Party, 
but that does not seem to have outlined, before October 23rd, a partnership with the people's 
democratic regime. 
However, the “restricted Cabinet” includes, next to the national Communists (Nagy, Kadar, 
first secretary of the party after the departure of Gero, and Losonczy) and two representatives 
of the smallholders’ party (Tildy and Kovacs), the old president of the National Peasant Party, 
Ferenc Erdei, and a delegate of the Social Democratic party, who was not yet appointed on 
October 31st. 
*** 
According to Nagy's speech, the Hungarian Government will be established "on the basis of 
1945, at the time of the coalition regime of democratic parties," which involves, as pointed 
out by Tildy, the end of the one-party system. 
It must be remembered that at the time of the occupation of Hungary by the Germans in 1944, 
the two major parties, the smallholders and the Social Democrats, had agreed with C.P. and 
the extremist Peasant Party, at that time few in numbers, the "National Peasant Party", to form 
the "National Front for independence." This formulation was also ephemeral, the C.P. having 
succedeed, despite the high percentage of votes obtained in the 1945 elections by the three 
non-communist parties (85%), to neutralize the opposition parties, without being forced to 
eliminate them officially, thanks to the infiltration of the army and police and later Rakosi 
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confessed thanks to "the presence of the red Army". Tildy Z., contrary to the attitude of 
Ferenc Nagy, had lent himself to weakness and embarrassment in this operation. 
*** 
The reference made by Nagy to the experience of 1945 has nothing encouraging for 
supporters of democratization and independence of Hungary. On October 31st, it was also not 
clear that Nagy had sincerely aligned with the demands of the moderate  insurgents. Power 
was poorly used and there was a rumor according to which Cardinal Mindszenty will be 
instructed to mediate between the different trends of insurrection or even to form a new 
government. The Hungarian army expressed its resoluteness to preserve the results of the 
insurrection, while in the provinces, and especially in Győr, numerous revolutionary 
committees express claims more and more anticommunist. (Nagy announced, in his speech of 
October 31st, that he recognized, in the name of the national government, local bodies of self-
direction which were formed democratically and as a result of the revolution, "and that the 
government "leaned on them and approved their activities"). 
It was therefore normal that the Social Democratic Party, through its current leaders, Anna 
Kethly and Gyula Kelemen, have expressed, as Bela Kovacs, some hesitation to adhere to the 
restricted cabinet formula. 
*** 
But the situation has changed very quickly, and on November 1st Nagy declared to the 
Embassy of the USSR that the Hungarian government denounced the Warsaw Pact and 
proclaimed the neutrality of the country. He let him know that he addressed to the UN to ask 
that the four great powers defend the Hungarian neutrality.  
Different sources report, on the other hand, an influx of Soviet troops in Hungary. According 
to some information, they would have also picked up in some places the fight against the 
insurgents.  
Will these new events contribute to the old democratic parties getting closer to the Nagy 
government? It can still not be guaranteed, this evening on November 2nd, and it is again a 
matter of the dismissal of Nagy and the formation of a government headed by smallholders 
and  nationalpeasants. On the other hand, no information has arrived that shows that the 
revolutionary committees and the Hungarian army are determined to cooperate with the 
government of Budapest. 
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Document 37 
Report of Mr. Dejean, Ambassador of France in Moscow to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs –  November 3 1956 
 
CABLE 95 
Mr. Dejean, Ambassador of France in Moscow, 
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
T. n°4361 to 4365. 
Priority. Reserved.  
Moscow, November 3rd, 1956, 1.40 pm 
Received: 11.40 am 
 
News regarding the deployment in Hungary of Soviet reinforcements, apparently from 
Ukraine and Romania and perhaps from East Germany, has spread yesterday afternoon, in 
Moscow. A number of diplomats were skeptical, considering that the USSR could not 
simultaneously place themselves in defense of Egyptian independence and brutally suppress 
the Hungarian uprising. Other people wondered if the deployement of troops and the 
encirclement of the airports did not correspond simply to the intention of ensuring, in the right 
conditions, the evacuation of Soviet troops and their families. 
In fact, it is to be feared that, sensing Hungary escape from any communist influence, the 
Soviet leaders have accepted the hard way, whether it's intimidation or bloody repression. The 
Soviet military seems to have aligned with this position. 
Marshal Zhukov said to the Ambassador of the United States that he did not want war in any 
way, not even being in the field of winners and added about Hungary: "these people will get 
off alone". From that moment, next to political reasons, military prestige considerations 
seemed to be at play.  Yesterday, at a reception for the Syrian president, the Soviet defense 
minister, faced by Mr. Bohlen, seemed elusive and he disappeared after a few minutes – as 
did Mr. Chepilov. 
Mr. Khrushchev was absent. The Soviet leaders, among whom there were Voroshilov, 
Boulganine, Mikoyan, Kaganovitch, showed cold faces for serious days.  
The foreign agencies have been waiting all night for an important statement by the Soviet 
government which will probably be published later in the day. 
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Document 38 
Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – November 3 1956 
 
CABLE 96 
Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest, 
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
Budapest, November 3, 1956. 
T. n° 698. 
(Received: 1.15 pm) 
 
I address to the Ministrythe text of a note verbale that has been delivered to this legation from 
the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the night between 2nd and 3rd November: 
“The President of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic responsible for 
the functions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs has the honor of communicating what 
follows: 
“The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic wishes to fix, in each case, through 
negotiations and beneficial agreements, the question of the evacuation of Soviet troops from 
the territory of Hungary. 
“The government has already expressed many times this intention and to prove its willingness 
to negotiate, has appointed some preparatory committees which have the task of specifying 
the expectation and the modalities of the evacuation. 
“The proposals concerning the composition of the committees, the place and time of 
negotiations, have already been notified by the Hungarian Government to the Ambassador of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Budapest. 
Despite all these facts, information and reports of our military sources prove that remarkable 
Soviet units have crossed the Hungarian border, they continue on their way to Budapest, 
taking possession of the lines and installations and stations. 
“We also have information that in the West Hungary, there are movements of Soviet troops in 
East-West direction. 
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“The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic has considered it necessary to ask for 
some information about this from Mr. Andropov, ambassador of the the Soviet Union in 
Budapest, and at the same time to express its repeated claim because of the movements of 
Soviet troops on Hungarian territory. 
“The facts mentioned above will be brought to the attention of all the heads of diplomatic 
missions accredited in Budapest by the Hungarian government, communicating to them also 
that the Security Council of the United Nations will be simultaneously informed of these new 
events”. 
“Budapest, November 2, 1956”. 
 
 
Document 39 
Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Cornut-Gentille, Head of 
Permanent Mission of France to the United Relations – November 3 1956 
 
CABLE 98 
Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
To Mr. Cornut-Gentille, Head of Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations. 
 
T. n°3539 
Absolute priority. Reserved. 
Paris, November 3rd, 1956, 7.10 pm. 
 
In your future discourseregarding the issue of Hungary, you will not be limited to supporting 
the notion of neutrality. 
You will support the need to allow the Hungarian people to decide about their future with free 
elections. 
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Document 40 
Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs –  November 3 1956 
 
CABLE 100 
 
Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest,  
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.  
  
T. n° 705 706. Priority.                                                        Budapest, November 3th, 1956 17h. 
10. 
                                                                                               (Received: 21 h.20.) 
 
 
The preliminary draft resolution that the Ministrywants to communicate to me, makes no 
mention of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry, which, on the basis of various Western 
radio stations, everyone is waiting here for – to the extent that the radio has announced since 
yesterday: the commission’s arrival by plane, the refusal of its landing by the Soviet 
authorities, then its imminent landing in Budapest airport.  
 
Local speculation has developed since October 29, and the presence of this commission 
would be preferable to the guarantee that the Soviet commandment seems to be seeking, that 
is against the entry of armed bands of emigrants, in the gradual implementation, yesterday and 
this morning, of a curtain of tanks along the Austrian border from the Danube to Sopron.  
 
 
 
Document 41 
Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Diplomatic Representatives of 
France in Moscow, New York (ONU), London, Washington, Bonn, Budapest, Warsaw –
November 3 1956 
 
CABLE 103 
Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
To Diplomatic Representatives of France in Moscow, New York (UN), London, Washington, 
Bonn, Budapest, Warsaw. 
T. n° 4446 to 4448; 3540 to 3542; 
11733 to 11735; 11895 to 11897; 
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3207 to 3209; 908 to 910; 
1419 to 1421. 
Very urgent. Reserved.  
Paris, November 3rd, 10.30 pm. 
 
The counsellor of the Soviet Embassy, whom the head of Europe [in the Ministry] had met 
with this afternoon to talk about the French journalists detained by Soviet troops at the 
Hungarian border, has presented, after promising to resolve the matter, very disturbing 
intentions on the development of things in Hungary . 
According to Mr. Erofeev, we must accept that the Nagy government does not represents 
anything now. He is devoid of authority, he denies having asked for Soviet intervention and 
aims to play the role of a "provocateur". So the neutrality which he declared cannot be taken 
seriously. 
On the other hand, this government tolerates fascist behaviours and adopts measures which 
are contrary to the spirit of socialism. In these conditions, the Soviet Union will be able to 
invoke the Article 4 of the Peace Treaty of to order to put end to the activity of these 
elements.  
Finally, interrogated about the scope of the statement of October 30th about Hungary, Mr. 
Erofeev responded that this statement concerns only the “socialist” countries; if Hungary was 
leaving the path of people's democracy, it could not invoke this statement. If it will remain 
there, many relaxations could be allowed. 
Warned of a recourse to force to save the “people's democracy”, Mr. Erofeev has avoided any 
response, taking refuge behind vague statements: everything will return to “order” quickly, 
the essential was keeping the peace in Europe. 
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Document 42 
Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Diplomatic Representatives of 
France in Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, Moscow, London, Washington, New York (UNO) –
November 4 1956 
 
CABLE 108 
Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
To Diplomatic Representatives of France in Berlin, Vienne, Budapest, Moscow, London, 
Washington, New York (UN). 
T. n°869; 965; 929; 
4466; 11780; 11940; 3589. 
Paris, November 4th, 1956, 12.15 am.  
 
The Hungarian military attaché in Paris tells the Ministry of National Defense that he received 
instructions from his government to make known to the military attachés accredited in Paris 
the provisions recently adopted by the Hungarian authorities and which are the following: 
1°The Hungarian government has proclaimed its neutrality; 
2° It has denounced the Warsaw Pact; 
3° It has asked the Soviet government for the immediate withdrawal of its forces from its 
territory. 
 
 
Document 43 
Report of Mr. Francois Seydoux, Ambassador of France in Vienna to Mr. Pineau, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs – November 4 1956 
 
CABLE 109 
Mr. Francois Seydoux, Ambassador of France in Vienna, 
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
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T. n°620 to 622. Priority. 
Vienna, November 4th, 1956, 12.50 am. 
(Received: 1.00 pm) 
 
After learning this morning, through the radio of the tragic news of the massive offensive by 
Soviet troops on Hungarian territory, I phoned at 7am our legation in Budapest. The 
counselor, Mr. Quioc, informed me that Pest was entirely occupied by tanks, artillery and the 
Russian infantry; the bridges over the Danube were controlled by some elements of the 
Honved. Since then, I have tried to re-establish contact with Mr. Paul-Boncour, but all 
telephone communications are interrupted. 
The emotion is all the stronger in Vienna than last night, despite the confirmation of the 
presence of Soviet tanks not far from the Austrian border; the leading circles and the public 
opinion signaled an optimism that was not entirely justified by the contradictory rumors in 
circulation. 
This note is in the Sunday press that is published early in the night. It's the negotiation started 
on November 3rd at noon in Budapest, between the Soviets and the Nagy government on the 
evacuation of Russian troops which is emphasized as an almost decisive event. The socialist 
organ announces that the agreement is imminent. The editorial of the newspaper Chancellor 
appears under the title "Hope". 
The duplicityof Moscow is so striking and premeditated in its details without doubt. Mr. Paul-
Boncour told me yesterday on the phone, that his Soviet colleague was saying that the passage 
between Vienna and Budapest will not be hindered from today; wanting to give the 
impression that it was a wrong move, the minister of the USSR would tell this joke: "it is 
necessary that the diplomats correct the mistakes of the military." 
I am also tempted to believe that at the Ballhausplatz, the Russians have tried to hide their 
game until the last moment. Saturday night in their speeches, Chancellor Raab and interim 
Vice-Chancellor Helmer have risen against the alarming information provided by the Austrian 
press on the movements of Soviet troops in Hungary. 
 
 
Document 44 
Report of Mr. Cornut-Gentille, Head of Permanent Mission of France to the United 
Nations to Ministry of Foreign Affairs – November 4 1956 
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CABLE 110 
Mr. Cornut-Gentille, Head of Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations 
To Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
T. n°2202 to 2204 
Immediate priority. 
 
New York, November 4th, 1956, 11h 
(Received: 5.00pm) 
 
To Mr. Louis Joxe and Mr. de Menthon. 
I refer to my telegram n° 2193. 
The Security Council met this morning, Sunday at 3pm, to examine the question of Hungary. 
After a brief debate, the draft resolution which was presented by the US delegation yesterday 
afternoon and slightly strengthened, was put to a vote and obtained nine votes to one (the vote 
of the USSR), and the Yugoslav delegate did not take part in the vote. The draft resolution was 
not adopted because the USSR exercised its veto. 
The behavior of the Yugoslav delegate deserves attention. He said that from November 3rd at 
3pm, he had been looking to obtain some instructions from his government, but without 
success. 
A second resolution, which sent the matter to the Emergency special session in the form of a 
"United for Peace” resolution, got ten votes and only Russia voted against. 
A special session of the Assembly is planned for tonight at 8pm, November 4th to hear the 
report of the Secretary General on the responses that Your Excellency and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd 
are to present to Mr. Hammarskjold, telegrams communicating the decision taken about Egypt 
on the night between Saturday and Sunday by the special Assembly. 
It is possible that the Hungarian question will subsequently be discussed. In any case before 
5am on Monday, November 5th. 
In accordance with the telephone instructions of Mr. de Crouy, Mr. de Guiringaud will insist 
on keeping the Hungarian question in the foreground. However, this should not obscure the 
fact that, owing to the events of the day in the Middle East and the answers of Your 
Excellency and Mr. Lloyd, we could have a long and difficult session about Egypt and find 
ourselves forward the proposal of a conviction or sanctions. It is essential, in this regard, that 
our friends are notified within a few hours. 
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Document 45 
Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Cornut-Gentille, Head of 
Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations – November 4 1945 
 
CABLE 111 
Mr. Pineau, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
To Mr. Cornut-Gentille, Head of Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations. 
T. n° 3609 to 3612. 
Absulute  priority. Immediate. Reserved. 
 
Paris, November 4th 1956, 7.50pm. 
 
Considering the seriousness of the information on the situation in Hungary, we must do 
everything possible to get the General Assembly to give priority to the examination of this 
situation. I leave to you the task of establishing with friendly delegations the most appropriate 
measures to achieve a result, without an initiative that could be taken, in this sense, to be 
interpreted as intending to delay the examination of the Egyptian question. 
In your speech, you will emphasise the seriousresponsibility of the United Nations in the 
tragic development of the situation in Hungary. You will emphasise the astonishment and 
indignation that the behaviour of the United Nations causes and that, despite the agonizing 
invitations that were sent from Budapest, it has delayed in seriously dealing with the 
Hungarian drama, where the existence of  a whole people is being questioned. 
You will try, on the other hand, to strengthen in every possible way, with the support of our 
friends, the American resolution. It is important that the latter be extremely severe for the 
USSR; it has to include in particular the condemnation of Soviet military action, it will ask for 
the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops, request for a return to conditions that ensure 
rights and fundamental freedoms of the people of Hungary and free elections under 
international supervision. 
As regards the possible establishment of an international police force, you will hint about it 
during your speech, but without proposing yourself an amendment for this purpose in the 
American project. In the event that such an amendment will be presented by another 
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delegation, you can support it. 
 
 
Document 46 
Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – November 4 1956 
 
CABLE 115 
Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest, 
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
 
Budapest, November 4, 1956. 3.30 pm 
(Received: 8.05 pm) 
 
Budapest was woken up at 5am from the cannons at the time when Imre Nagy, by radio 
statement, communicated that the negotiations were interrupted yesterday at 10pm, and that 
the Russians were attacking the city. He called for resistance. This morning, Pest was invaded 
by troops accompanied by Russian infantry, who occupied the bridges and the surrounding 
hills. In Pest, despite energetic interventions at the USSR embassy..49 Soviet and a bombing 
of the Killian barracks and along the Danube and in the workers' suburbs of Czepel [Csepel]. 
A new government allegedly installed in Szolnok or in Szeged, has been formed with Kadar 
and Apro. Nagy would be on the run. Colonel Maleter and General Kiraly were arrested at the 
end of the negotiations relating to the evacuation. An impression of astonishment reigns over 
the city, although some resistance groups are organizinghere and there. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
49 Decryption gap. 
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Document 47 
Report of Mr. Baelen, Ambassador of France in Belgrade to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – November 6 1956 
 
CABLE 131 
 
Mr. Baelen, Ambassador of France in Belgrade, 
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
T. n° 958 to 960. 
 
Belgrade, November 6th, 1956, 8.30 am. 
(Received 12.38 am) 
 
Following my previous telegram. 
After having favored the combination of Nagy-Gero, and then supporting the attempt of Nagy, 
the Yugoslavians give now their ....50 to the Kadar government, immediately recognized. 
This adaptation to the circumstances involves the abandonment of certain principles: at the 
moment when the fate of socialism was put into play, the questions of equal rights, non-
interference and democratization have lost much of their value, at least for the communities of 
the eastern countries. If the Yugoslavs recall that it is [the intervention] in any case contrary to 
their principles, they still basically justify the Soviet move. 
In fact, the Belgrade leaders have found themselves between the danger of an excessive 
democratization that risked questioning their progressive achievements, which are an 
unfortunate example for their own public opinion, and the danger of a return to Stalinist 
methods, with those involving threats to world peace and for Yugoslav independence. 
The embarrassment of Belgrade leaders is understandable. The Hungarian crisis  forces them 
to make a choice that they could avoided until now; indeed, it seriously damages the position 
and the role of Marshal Tito  concerning the satellite countries; furthermore, a return to the 
Cold War and the bloc system marks  the vanity of the existing basic policy [of Belgrade] ...51 
and the failure of efforts made by Yugoslavia over the past years. 
                                                             
50 Decryption gap. 
51 Decryption gap. 
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Document 48 
Note from the Sub-directorate of Eastern Europe about the events in Hungary –
November 6 1956 
  
CABLE 137 
 
Note from the Sub-directorate of Eastern Europe  
about the events in Hungary  
   
                                                                                                          Paris, 6 November 1956. 
 
 
 
Insurgent for twelve days, the Hungarian people have fought heroically for freedom. 
Hundreds of Soviet tanks were needed to reduce it. 
 
I 
From October 24th, the revolutionaries demanded free elections, and the establishment with 
the USSR of relations based on equality. The Hungarian army had united with the people and 
with all the political cadres in a great movement of national unanimity.  
Whatever may have been the intentions of the Budapest government, this movement has 
imposed itself by its spontaneity and its popular strength. It is impressive today to note the 
concordance of the claims formulated – in the most diverse regions – by the workers as well 
as by the peasants or intellectuals. All over, the independence of the country, inner freedom, 
an improvement of the living conditions were at the forefront of action plans. The social 
progress which Hungary has, since the war, paid for with so much misery, was not called into 
question: far from wanting to return their estates to former great landowners or factories to the 
societies of yore, as was claimed in Moscow, the insurgents demanded the redistribution of 
land to the peasants, the development of the action of trade unions and workers’ committees.  
 
The framework of the regime of the people’s democracy has certainly been surpassed. But in 
spite of manifestations explained by the sudden return to freedom, the USSR was not attacked 
as a nation by the government of Budapest, moreover it was led by a communist – and many 
testimonies show that, during the first days, the Soviet soldiers themselves were not the object 
of a feeling of systematic hostility. In some villages, the population publicly thanked those 
who had not used their weapons.  
 
                                                                          
II 
 
 
A peaceful solution was therefore possible even, apparently, from the point of view of Soviets 
interests.  
Until November 2, only the withdrawal of the foreign troops was demanded: Hungary’s 
membership of the Warsaw Pact was not called into question. Provided that it promised to 
respect the independence of the country and to put an end to its economic exploitation, the 
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Soviet Union was still able, at that moment, to lay the foundations for normal cooperation 
with the Hungarian Republic.  
But, even if the government of Moscow had agreed, after 2 November, to accept that Hungary 
became neutral, this neutrality guaranteed, in any case, the USSR against the participation of 
Budapest in the defensive association of the Western powers. 
On the internal plane, a position of democratic socialism could be drawn up; it is already in 
the process of taking shape. The only eventuality that was excluded – if the Hungarian people 
had been left free – would have been the return to the single-party system.  
 
III 
   
 
This is what the Soviet Union didn’t want. In its statement of October 30, it recognized the 
legitimacy of the aspirations of the Hungarian workers; it declared that it regretted that blood 
had been spilt in Hungary, and agreed to discuss with the Budapest authorities, as well as with 
the other signatories of the Warsaw Treaty, the presence of Soviet armed troops. 
 
But, by asserting that “the peoples of the socialist countries would not allow reaction to shake 
the foundations of the regime of people’s democracy”, the Kremlin has specified, without 
ambiguity, the limit which it intends to fix for the envisaged concessions.  
 
Also, the Soviet troops which had gone out of Budapest from 29 October to 3 November, 
while a negotiated solution developed, were brought in there in force to crush the Revolution, 
when it has proved that Nagy was appealing “as in 1945” to all democratic groups, ended the 
single-party regime, and proclaimed his intention to organize free elections.  
Thus, it is only within the framework of communism imposed by force, that the government 
of Moscow envisages the independence and sovereignty of peoples whom it claims to respect. 
It is in the name of freedom, and especially freedom of vote, that the Hungarian revolution 
took place, and it is because of this fundamental claim that the Red Army received a mission 
to come and crush it. 
 
The New Kadar government, that Radio Moscow presents as “revolutionary, peasant and 
worker”, doesn’t announce in its program the opening of negotiations for the immediate 
withdrawal of Soviet troops – which constituted one of the essential points of the Nagy 
program. It specifies on the contrary, that such talks will be subordinated to “the restoration of 
the order”, and doesn’t hesitate to acknowledge that it asked the command of the Soviet 
troops to help to “bring peace to the country”.  
There is more: the Hungarian military mission sent by Imre Nagy to negotiate the withdrawal 
of Hungary from the Warsaw Pact disappeared in a complete trap.  
And, while at the weekend, the critics from Pravda against fascism aimed to create visibly the 
psychological climate of an intervention, the Russian representatives in Budapest and in New 
York spread, in a concentrated way, news to persuade of the success of the negotiations, and 
sought thereby to deceive the vigilance of the Hungarian people and the United Nations. 
There is not only the mark of a revolting cynicism, but clear evidence of premeditation. 
 
IV 
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The French government has, for its part, requested, from the October 26th , the inclusion in the 
agenda of the Security Council, of the question posed by the intervention of the Soviet troops 
in Hungary. The council, having met on 28 October, has acceded to this request, despite the 
opposition of the USSR and the abstention of Yugoslavia.  
 
The debate about Hungary could not, unfortunately, be immediately started. The calm, which 
has appeared from the October 28th, in the fighting between the Hungarian insurgents and the 
forces of the USSR, and the Soviet Declaration of October 30, explain, in part, this delay. But 
it is also due to the attitude of a large number of powers, that failed to, or did not want to, see 
that the fate of freedom was being played out in Hungary.  
 
November 2nd, at the request of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, the 
Security Council resumes the examination of the question, and, this time, the call initiated by 
the Nagy government. A new session is held on November 3: the Security Council asks the 
USSR, in accordance with an American resolution, to withdraw its troops from Hungary. 
 
In the night from 3 to 4 November, when the powers were informed of the armed intervention 
of Soviet troops, the Security Council meets urgently. The American resolution is then 
approved by nine votes against one vote, that of the USSR, which opposes using its veto. But 
the general assembly is immediately seized. It adopts, by fifty votes against eight and fifteen 
abstentions (those in particular of numerous Asian states, India, etc.) a resolution proposed by 
the United-States and reinforced by a French amendment, which requires the withdrawal 
without delay of Soviet forces and gives to the Secretary General of the UnitedNations a 
mission to propose, as quickly as possible, methods to put an end to the foreign intervention.  
 
The French government is firmly committed to continue its action at the level of the United 
Nations, so that, despite the unleashing of force against an unarmed people, the fate of 
Hungary, that of its heroic people, can’t be decided in the secret and in disregard of the 
principles of justice and freedom.   
 
But the French government, the whole French people have, from the first hours of the 
insurrection, put everything in place to assist the Hungarian people, its wounded persons, its 
families in distress. Five planes carrying twenty tons of drugs and food have been sent to 
Vienna, hence, with the help of the Austrian Red Cross whose cooperation has been 
admirable – aid is sent to the neighbouring country.  An additional sixty tons were sent by 
railways. Radio calls allowed to gather in total, nearly two hundred and fifty tons of food, 
drugs, equipment of all kinds. As far as the means of transportation of which we have and 
need are able to, these materials are sent day by day to Hungary to try to ease the miseryof its 
people.  
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Document 49 
Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Broustra, Head ad interim of 
the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations – November 8 1956 
 
CABLE 143 
Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
To Mr. Broustra, Head ad interim of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations. 
T. n°3785 to 3790 
Immediate transmission. Reserved. 
 
Paris, November 8th, 1956, 4.00 pm. 
 
Your intervention before the Assembly about the Hungarian question will be based in a 
general manner on the instructions that you have been sent by telegram n°3609  and that 
underline the great responsibility of the United Nations in the tragic development of the 
situation in Hungary. 
You will insist on the extreme urgency of the implementation of the resolution passed by the 
General Assembly on November 4th  of which you will resume all the points. 
I underline that the main interest focuses, as you will recall, on the different missions assigned 
by paragraphs 4 and 7 of resolution to the Secretary General. 
1° Did it create a real investigation about the situation provoked by the Soviet intervention in 
Hungary? The United Nations could not be satisfied by a consideration that does not put in 
full light all aspects of this situation. 
2°Did it appoint and send on-site some representatives to observe the situation directly? 
3°What methods does it propose to stop the foreign intervention in Hungary? In this regard, as 
I have already indicated to you, you will support any proposal that will be submitted, 
according to press reports, by Italy and Pakistan in view of the establishment of an 
international force, and you will engage to obtain that the resolution presented be as close as 
possible to that voted regarding the situation in the middle East. 
4°What measures did it take in accordance with paragraph 7 of the resolution? The question is 
therefore all the more serious – that the Hungarian border is closed and that all Red Cross 
convoys are blocked. The press announces, on the other hand, that the Kadar government has 
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just declared that it would be unworthy to accept "the aid of the capitalist countries". Misery, 
however, reaches in cities and especially in Budapest unimaginable proportions. 
I believe that theSecretary General, by virtue of the mandate that has been given it, has the 
duty to immediately contact the Soviet government, as well as the Hungarian Government, 
asking them to comply with international conventions and to allow that all possible reliefs are 
taken without limitation to the civilian population. 
It is no less urgent to take care of people who, at the time, are chased, deported or 
exterminated without trial and they are delivered to all the excesses of an arbitrary power. In 
this field the Conventions of 1949 impose on the belligerents rigorous duties that we have the 
obligation to enforce. 
 
 
Document 50 
Report of Mr. Quioc, Chargé d’Affaire of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – November 8 1956 
 
CABLE 145 
Mr. Quioc, Chargé d’affaires of France in Budapest 
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
T. n° 727 to 731. Reserved. 
Budapest, November 8, 1956. 5.00 pm. 
(Received: 9.10 pm) 
 
In total agreement with Mr. Paul-Boncour, I draw your attention to the following information: 
2) The resistance has not decreased in the outskirts of the city in spite of the systematic 
cleansing and the destruction of the center.The Russian troops in Hungary do not stop 
increasing and they have surpassed two and a half divisions on October 23 to at least 
eight divisions on November 6. The results obtained are far from correspondent to this 
inflow and it must have been the Soviets who at first were surprised at this.   
On the evening of Saturday, November 3, the ambassador of the USSR said to M. 
Paul-Bancour: "In a maximum three days conduct will be restored everywhere", which 
clarifies retrospectively the illusions cultivated by the Russians. 
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3) The government is nowhere to be found and the Minister of Yugoslavia tried 
unsuccessfully yesterday to reach Kadar. General Grebennik, Russian commander in 
Budapest, gives his orders to the population through leaflets. 
 
4) There is, from side to side, a certain desire of understanding.  
Secret military negotiations were interrupted on the evening of November 5, but no one 
knows whether they will be restarting.  
The insurgents are aware of the precariousness of their position, but they are encouraged by 
the real local success and by the fact that the means used were disproportionate. The military 
supply of Soviet troops is difficult and their wounded in the hospitals admit they do not know 
why they fight. 
The ideological positions of the combatants of the two sides are not far away and no one 
knows to what extent the revolt and aspirations of Hungarians will not touch the Russians. 
5) If the requirement for the evacuation of Russian troops isessential, spirits are more 
divided on the need for neutrality.  
6) I have learned through the radio that Britain is associated with a Pakistani proposition 
leaning towards the occupation of the territory by an international force. If this project 
is approved, it will complicate in my opinion, at the same time both the ceasefire and 
setting a deadline for the evacuation of Russians and for the delivery of weapons from 
the partisans, as the former can not lose face and the latter do not want to holster their 
weapons immediately. This force would be composed mostly of troops from 
neighbouring powers that should take the commitment of abstention and disinterest. 
7) In this hypothesis, the government should not have to be made up, at least for a period, 
by representatives of numerousparties, this would be unpopular and would take little 
into account of the sacrifices and the weight of the insurgency; it will also expose it to 
the accusations made against reactionaries and immigrants. 
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Document 51 
Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Broustra, Head ad interim of 
Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations – November 9 1956 
 
CABLE 148 
Mr. Pineau, Minister of  Foreign Affairs, 
To Mr. Broustra, Head ad interim of Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations. 
T. n°3831 to 3836. 
Immediate. Reserved. 
 
Paris, November 9th, 1956, 3.00pm. 
 
I refer to the instructions that I sent you yesterday as well as to your telegram n°2313 and 
2312.  
Apart from some actions, such as Cuba, the general attitude of the United Nations in the 
Hungarian question gives an impression of slowness and weakness, difficult to sustain in the 
presence of the  brutality of the intervention and horrors of Soviet repression. Moreover, 
public opinion hardly understands the difference in behavior between the frenzy of the 
Assembly and the zeal of the Secretary General in matters of the Near East.  
It is important that with the help of delegations who share our feelings, you encourage the 
Assembly towards more vigorous action. 
First of all, it is desirable to reinforce the Italian draft resolution, judged insufficient and a 
step backward compared to what we contemplated. 
The considerations are satisfactory, but in the device, the first paragraph should be replaced 
by these three: 
“1)Insist for the USSR government to immediately stop its intervention in Hungary, to 
proclaim a ceasefire and to withdraw its forces from Hungary without further delay;” 
“2)Insist for the USSR government to strictly comply with the Convention on the protection 
of civilians in time of war of August 12th, 1949, especially the Article 3;” 
“3) I insist that all relevant authorities on Hungarian territory allow free access to the missions 
regularly authorized by the International Red Cross so that they can exercise their 
humanitarian work with no obstacle.” 
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The best thing is that you agree with your Italian colleague to transform his resolution, which 
will then receive our patronage. 
The press has published elements of a US resolution on aid to the Hungarian population. I 
leave to you the task of evaluating to what extent the previous paragraph 3 does not constitute 
a duplication of this resolution. 
On the other hand, in your speech, you will underline the need for the Secretary General to 
spare nothing in the quick implement of the decisions of the Assembly concerning Hungary. 
You will show that everywhere in the Near East, hostilities have ceased, while in Hungary, an 
entire people is subjected to ruthless repression. We recognize the difficulty of the task of Mr. 
Hammarskjold, but the gravity of events is such that everything must be put in place to stop 
the bloodshed in Hungary. 
 
 
Document 52 
Report of Mr. Broustra, Head ad interim of Permanent Mission of France at the United 
Nations to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – November 10 1956 
 
CABLE 155 
Mr. Broustra, Head ad interim of Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, 
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
T. n°2319 to 2328 
Priority. Reserved. 
 
New York, November 10th, 1956, 7.00am. 
(Received. 7.00pm) 
 
November 9th, 1956. 
As the debate about the question of Hungary continued in the Assembly Hall, Mr. Cabot 
Lodge, meeting Mr. de Guiringaud in the corridors, said a few kind words about the speech 
that he would have pronounced at the end of the morning session. It was the first time in many 
days that the US delegation approached us. Mr. de Guiringuad took the opportunity to talk to 
the permanent representative of the United States and tell him, directly, how the policy of his 
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government seemed incomprehensible and dangerous. 
Mr. de Guiringaud noted to Mr. Cabot Lodge that, for ten years, the US government, through 
the mediation of the Radio Free Europe emissions, encouraged the peoples of the other side of 
the Iron Curtain in resisting Soviet oppression. When one of them, taking advantage of the 
thaw in Moscow's empire, raised and kept up victory for several days against the Red Army, 
the United States were content with some debate at the United Nations and helping Moscow, 
with the support of the Arab-Asians, to divert attention  on the Middle East. 
If the US had wanted to, the United Nations would not have waited five days without doing 
anything for Hungary. Now that the revolt of the Hungarian patriots will be practically 
crushed, what is the importance of resolutions voted by an organization that is beginning to be 
discredited?  
We know, from good sources, that the Radio Free Europe Hungarian staff intended to resign 
en masse to protest against the attitude of the US government. Some of them said that 
America had behaved towards them like the Russians against the Poles during the siege of 
Warsaw. 
Is it what the US government wanted? If we remain on a similar impression, Europe would 
soon be communist. For now, all over Western Europe, the majority of public opinion protests 
against the action of Moscow and requests an intervention in aid for the insurgents in 
Budapest. But in a few months, if this European opinion had to note that any resistance to the 
Soviet power was destined to failure, if Poland, if Berlin were, after Hungary, to be again be 
reduced to slavery, free Europe will live no more.How is it that the Washington government 
doesn't understand such a danger? How is it that it does not understand that it is losing all 
prestige and all credit with the peoples of Europe?  
We know that is not the case, but how can we prevent certain people from thinking that the 
United States is dividing the world with the Russians: freedom to act in Europe, as long as 
they don't intervene directly in the Near East? 
How can French and the British opinion understand that there are two weights and two 
measures, one  to condemn France and England where they defended the free world in 
Suez,and another one to absolve Russia which oppressed the Hungarian patriots? 
Mr. Cabot Lodge, who had been listening with great attention, seemed very moved by this 
observation: "But what can we do?" he said. Mr. de Guiringaud then reminded him that the 
United States agreed to  the maneuver with which Boulganine had stopped the French-British 
operation in Suez. Couldn't President Eisenhower, with the moral authority that he possesses 
and the power that he represents, launch this evening a solemn appeal to the Soviets to give 
his guarantee and his support for the resolutions adopted by the United Nations and to require 
the Russians to cease the fighting, to withdraw their troops and to leave that observers and 
humanitarian UN missions enter in Hungary? 
Such an initiative obviously involves risks. But if we don't want to risk today, there will be 
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more serious risks in the short term or we will have to renounce to the existence of the free 
world. Mr. Cabot Lodge thanked Mr. de Guiringaud for having talked to him with "such 
brutality and frankness”. After discussing for a few moments, he said that the idea of an 
appeal of the President seemed to him excellent. He added that he would call him 
immediately. It was 4pm local time. 
Sir Pierson Dixon, to whom Mr. de Guiringaud communicated this conversation, pleaded 
entirely in agreement with the proposals made towards Mr. Cabot Lodge. He added that, for 
his part, he would have said this morning to the American representative: "Your policy of 
recent days was driven by emotional reactions, you should start to think." At the moment 
when I send this telegram, Mr. Cabot Lodge has just gone up to the rostrum  for defending 
again the resolution that he had deposited this morning. He did it with more decisive terms 
and above all he said "it should not to have two weights and two measures,  one for Hungary, 
another for Suez." 
 
 
 
Document 53 
Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors of France in 
Washington and London – November 13 1956 
 
CABLE 167 
Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
To the Ambassadors of France in Washington and London. 
T. n°12534 to 12536; 
12364 to 12366. 
Reserved. 
 
Paris, November 13th, 1956. 24 h. 
 
The problem of maintaining diplomatic relations with the new Hungarian government has 
been invoked at the Ministry from the US Embassy, I shall be grateful if you ask anything in 
this regard at this, Washington: Department of State; London: Foreign Office. 
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Please, at the same time gather his opinion, have the following reserves about the principle of 
a rupture of diplomatic relations with Hungary: 
1. On the moral level, this rupture would risk to appear in the eyes of the Hungarian 
population, subjected to a great test, as the sign of an abandonment by the West; 
2. On the political level, it would mean the disappearance of an important observation point in 
time when Hungary is at a crossroads where it is important to follow the development of the 
Soviet attitude; 
3. The Kadar government is going to oppose the sending of UN observers in Hungary, it 
seems all the more appropriate for the Western powers, follow on the spotthe problem of the 
potential evacuation of Soviet troops and that of Western aid distribution to the affected 
populations; 
4. Finally, though the political situation in Hungary remains unclear, it has not been said 
whether the sacrifices of the Hungarian people have been otiose and that the intervention of 
Soviet troops had destroyed the main demands of the population. 
 
 
Document 54 
Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – November 14 1956 
 
CABLE 174 
Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest, 
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
 
Budapest, November 14, 1956. 16.50. (received: 20.45) 
 
It seems to be confirmed that Nagy took refuge at the Delegation of Yugoslavia where he 
must have met Kadar (although this delegation is on bad terms with him since his latest 
activities, while recognizing their forced character). 
I have been also informed that relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia could be at a 
delicate phase. 
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Document 55 
Report of Mr. Alphand, Ambassador of France in Washington to Mr. Pineau, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs – November 15 1956 
 
CABLE 185 
Mr. Alphand, Ambassador of France in Washington, 
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
T. n°7215 to 7217. 
Reserved.  
 
Washington, November 15th, 8.00am. 
(Received: 5.25pm) 
 
November 14th, 1956. 
The Deputy undersecretary of State for European  Affairs said to the Minister Counsellor of 
this embassy that the US government would have some information about the deportations to 
the USSR of young Hungarians as a result of recent events. The spokesman of the Department 
of State has mentioned it this afternoon. The United States reserved the right to discuss the 
issue ahead of the United Nations, but they would agree with us in advance. 
They didn't intend to break off diplomatic relations with this country, sharing our opinions on 
this subject (your telegrams n°12534 and 12537) and considering themselves as also required 
to give refuge to Cardinal Mindszenty. However, as their representative in Budapest has just 
arrived to his diplomatic station and  has not yet handed over his letter of credence, it was 
decided that he would remain in office until the Kadar government does not ask him to 
present it. 
In this hypothesis, the position would be assigned to a chargé d’affaires and the minister be 
recalled to the United States. 
The State Department would not see as a serious drawback that some small members of 
NATO  break their diplomatic relations with Hungary, as they seem to want to do. The matter 
will be examined in the North Atlantic Council. 
As to the question of the powers of the Hungarian delegation to the General Assembly of the 
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United Nations, it won't be raised in the coming days because the State Department does not 
want to bother Mr. Hammarskjold as long as the negotiations of the Secretary general with 
Mr. Horvat, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, currently in New York, continue. 
But the issue will be evoked further ahead the Commission for the verification of powers of 
the United Nations where Mr. Beam thinks that a majority could be gathered against the 
validation. 
 
 
Document 56 
Report of Mr. De Boisanger, Ambassador of France in Prague to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – November 15 1956 
 
CABLE 187 
Mr. De Boisanger, Ambassador of France in Prague, 
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
T. n°1198. 
Reserved. 
 
Prague, November 15th,1956, 7.00pm. 
(Received: on 16th, 0h.22) 
 
The departure for Budapest of Mr. Siroky caused some surprise here. 
It had not been expected. Note the fact that members of the government that will accompany 
the Prime Minister belong, all three of them, to the non-communist parties of the National 
Front. The importance of the government delegation seems to reinforce the aid plan for 
Hungary announced yesterday and the reason for the official trip given, that is the testimony 
of friendship and solidarity with the Kadar government and the Hungarian people. 
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Document 57 
Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Broustra, Chef ad interim of 
the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations –November 16 1956 
 
CABLE 188 
Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
To Mr. Broustra, Chef ad interim of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations. 
T. n°4221 to 4223. 
Priority. 
Paris, November 16th, 1956, 3.00pm. 
 
Mr. Turbet-Delof, our cultural advisor in Budapest, came from Hungary on the evening of 
November 13th, and communicated to the Ministrythe following information on the situation 
in Hungary: 
 
1° Soviet intervention. 
Numerous cases of fraternisation of Soviet soldiers with the insurgents occurred. In some 
cases, weapons and even tanks were given to them, especially at the beginning of the 
insurrection, when the tanks were not accompanied by infantry. An entire battalion has 
provided its armament. Soviet losses wereserious: in the only district of Czepel [Csepel], five 
hundred soviet injured were counted. The troops were limited to controlling the main roads 
and haven't ventured to control the small streets. 
 
2° Kadar government. 
The government fights vainlyy to win recognition by the country. The resistance is more or 
less general and manifests itself publicly without fear: government posters are publicly torn 
down. The ministerial services don't work, except in the fields of alimentation and public 
services. The total shortage of coal prevents the resumption of work in the factories. 
 
3° Attitude of the population. 
The Hungarian army was surprised by the events in a period of full reorganization, that is in 
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the disorder which has encouraged the autonomous reaction of different units. 
The civilian population, and especially the youth, gave evidence of extraordinary resolve in 
resistance and fighting. The working mass, conscious of its national interests, has maintained 
the factories and has consistently opposed, in general, acts of sabotage. 
 
 
Document 58 
Report of Mr. Dejean, Ambassador of France in Moscow to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – November 16 1956 
 
CABLE 189 
Mr. Dejean, Ambassador of France in Moscow, 
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
T. n°4597 to 4600. 
 
Moscow, November 16th, 1956, 5.50pm. 
(Received: 6.00pm) 
 
In the difficult circumstances that the international communist movement finds itself in after 
the Soviet repression in Hungary, the support that some brother parties give the Soviet 
Union's Party is used here to reinforce the confidence of the militants. The loyalty expressed 
by the French Communist Party despite the “fascist provocations” that it suffers. is 
particularly thanked for. But the most appreciated aid is that of the Chinese Communist Party. 
The Pravda of November 15th has reproduced the article dedicated the day before by Jen 
Minh Ji-Pao to the events in Hungary. It gives full Chinese approval to Soviet action, 
absolutely necessary and not at all in contradiction with the declaration of 30th October and 
the five principles of peaceful co-existence; it confirms that as soon as order is re-established, 
negotiations will take place "regarding the stationing of Soviet forces in Hungary on the basis 
of the Warsaw Treaty" and declares that there is no question of accepting any control by 
police forces of the United Nations. In conclusion, the newspaper of the Chinese Communist 
Party, reflecting the problems that the Hungarian crisis has provoked in the consciences of the 
communist in Western Europe, compare them to those that caused the defamation campaign 
conducted against the Soviet Union in 1939. It must be said clearly that the Soviet repression 
of the Hungarian uprising causes in the communist world, and especially in the West, a crisis 
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as serious as the Stalinist collusion with Nazism signed by the German-Soviet pact. But the 
Chinese, who are turning to the foreign Communists with the growing authority of which they 
give evidence, ask them to analyze these difficult and complex events with the cold realism of 
Marxism and not to let go in to defeat and confusion; of this courageous lucidity, the French 
Communist Party gives, according to Beijing, an obvious example.  
The vital role played by China in international communism appears thereby more and more 
evident. Helping the USSR, refusing to surrender to the temptation of “purity” and agreeing to 
dirty their hands to save the cause of socialism compromised by the errors of the Stalinists, 
the Chinese Communists are given the additional benefits for future discussions with the 
Soviets on the definition of the general line. 
 
 
Document 59 
Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Broustra, Head ad interim of 
the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations – November 17 1956 
 
CABLE 195 
Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
To Mr. Broustra, Head ad interim of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations. 
 
T. n°4350 to 4357. 
Absolute priority. 
 
Paris, November 17th , 1956, 11.55pm. 
 
I am sending you, here, for all purposes, a brief summary of the current situation in Hungary. 
1. Though the intervention of Soviet troops has re-established an almost total calm in 
Budapest, the Kadar government cannot consolidate its authority. The passive resistance of 
the population continues and it seems that some insurgent groups have retained their weapons. 
The authorities make the greatest efforts both on the external side to receive a guarantee and 
on the internal side to resume contact with the population and win the support of both the 
peasants and workers and intellectuals. 
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2.The Cabinet - composed of seven communist ministers - looks like a simple "Council of 
government", intended to be expanded if other contributions can be found. This is the reason 
why it has entered into negotiations, so far fruitless, with the Peasant Party leaders (Mr. Szabo 
and Mr. Bibo) and the Smallholders Party. 
On the other hand, since its multiple appeals for the resumption of work remained without 
results, it  was forced to accept to discuss, with the workers' representatives, the different 
claims of the insurgents. It is under these conditions that he has obtained, under the terms of a 
modus vivendi defined on November 16th , that the "workers Committee of Budapest" invites 
workers to return in the factories. However, this revolutionary organ proclaimed at the same 
time that it was refusing to abandon "one iota of the achievements and goals of the national 
uprising” of which the main points remain: departure of Soviet troops; back to the formula of 
a Nagy-style coalition government; free elections with plurality of parties and neutrality of 
Hungary. 
In addition, the Kadar Government published a decree granting extensive rights to the 
workers’ councils, and has banned from the political life the most compromised Communist 
leaders associated with Rakosi and Gero. 
Finally, he promised the opening of negotiations for the evacuation of Soviet troops without 
specifying the term; the liquidation of the political police; ending the system of compulsory 
delivery of agricultural goods, the suppression of the Soviet uniform for the army and of 
mandatory teaching of Russian in schools as well as the increase in wages. 
However, popular mistrust persists towards the Kadar government and is worsened by a few 
days because of rumors more and more widespread in Hungary and in the neighboring 
countries about deportations of hundreds of Hungarian citizens to the Soviet Union. Radio-
Budapest announced on November 15th  that the railway workers of Szolnok, who had 
returned to work, went on strike again at the news of the "mass deportations". 
3. In order to give his support to the Kadar Government, the Czechoslovak prime minister, 
Mr. Siroky, on November 15th , visited Budapest for a few hours. To the terms of the 
statement published, the Czechoslovak government approves the Budapest government for 
having requested the help of the USSR; it rejects as "illegal" the UN resolutions and accuses 
the organization of not respecting "the principle of non-interference in the Hungarian affairs".  
On the other hand, Mr. Kadar and Mr. Siroky have decided to develop further still Hungarian-
Czechoslovak relations in every fields.  
4. For his part, Marshal Tito, visibly concerned about the pressure that a Hungarian 
democracy, more or less Western, would exert on the internal regime of his country, is not 
afraid to say, in his speech at Pula, that the second Soviet military intervention in Hungary 
had been made inevitable by the need to save "the further building of socialism in this country 
and the world peace." He has limited himself to giving a view of foreign troops after "the 
restore of order and peace". The latter point of view connects quite exactly the USSR and 
Hungary. 
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The head of the Yugoslav Government also stated, in a somewhat contradictory way, that on 
point of principle Yugoslavia could not approve of foreign interference in Hungarian affairs. 
 
 
Document 60 
Report of Mr. Alphand, Ambassador of France in Washington to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – November 18  1956 
 
CABLE 197 
Mr. Alphand, Ambassador of France in Washington, 
To Mr. Pineu, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
T. n°7318. 
 
Washington, November 18th , 1956, 11.45am 
(Received: 5.45pm) 
 
In the course of the interview that I had with him on the afternoon of November 17th , Mr. 
Robert Murphy has indicated to me that, according to information received today by State 
Department from good sources, the deportations from Hungary to the USSR would cease. 
On the other hand, the under-secretary of State has underlined how much importance was 
given here to the speech pronounced in Pula by Marshal Tito last Sunday, that revealed the 
existence of some doubts in central and Balkan Europe about the good political judgment of 
the leaders of the Kremlin. 
 
 
Document 61 
Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – November 18 1956 
 
CABLE 198 
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Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest, 
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
 
Budapest, November 18, 1956. 
(Received: on 21st, 6.20 pm) 
 
I refer to my communication of the 14th of this month and my slips n° 1052/EU and n° 
1053/IP with this letter.  
Neighborhood by neighborhood, block by block, street by street, house by house, apartment 
by apartment, the hunting of young men continues, methodically made by teams in which 
survivors, ultimately very numerous, of the lynchings of the old political police - today 
officially dissolved - collaborate with the Russian troops; I witness to harrowing scenes; 
rescue calls are made to our diplomatic car as they pass in front of a building during an 
inspection. 
There would be the reason to take up arms to this heroic people: that it hid for ten days –and I 
do not exclude some sporadic rebellions – if you don't consider in any moment the terrible 
disaster that afflict the capital under its debris. Measuring, the lamentable consequences of 
their patriotic folly of three weeks ago, the spirits of today have scarcely any other obsessions 
than those of daily bread or flight to Austria. 
The strike and other forms of passive or active resistance are only the substitute of the third 
fight what the Soviet armored patrols are waiting for, which are as numerous, powerful and 
stirring as during the best days of insurrection... and destruction. The urban tactic of the 
Russian command was without doubt neither remarkable nor winning in terms of military 
technique, but it is clear that it has succeeded in crushing the revolution on the moral level. 
Kadar has claimed to have obtained the arrests of the deportations of young people; we were 
also told that, thanks to his intervention, the convoys could be arrested in the Hungarian part 
of the frontier station; Someone affirmed to have heard the prisoners screaming in chorus 
their patriotic enthusiasm or their desperation in their wagons. Whose blackmail will be 
prepared for a nation that refuses to cooperate – for its politicians? For the working masses on 
strike? 
If deportation to the USSR was really no longer expected, who needs the abduction and 
detention of all young people, collectively and jointly made responsible for the insurrectional 
movement? Is it possible to conceive, on the Hungarian territory and in the atmosphere of the 
revolution, only one concentration camp where the guards will inspire confidence to the 
Moscovite responsible for this radical process of destruction of a revolution from its base?  
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As long as in any case, they will apply these methods, I think it's useless to expect that Imre 
Nagy or some other Hungarian politician, worthy of the name, even a wannabe of Rakosi, will 
leave to “embark” by Kadar willingly. There is a little bit too much floating prison in the 
galley of the government and the miserable Imre Horváth is wearing the colors at the UN. 
 
 
Document 62 
Report of Mr. Dejean, Ambassador of France in Moscow to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – November 19 1956 
 
CABLE 201 
Mr. Dejean, Ambassador of France in Moscow, 
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
T. n°4656 to 4666. 
Priority. 
 
Moscow, November 19th , 1956, 8.45pm. 
(Received: 6.45pm) 
 
Because of its scope and its complexity, the Soviet declaration of November 17th gives a 
measure of the current difficulties that afflict the USSR and force a vast operation of diversion 
and propaganda. 
The Moscow government is trying, first of all, to divert attention from the events in Hungary. 
For this purpose, it has up until now fully exploited the Egyptian question. But the ceasefire 
deprives it of its essential argument and forces it to use statements whose deceptive nature is 
evident. On the other hand, it knows that the Arab governments are beginning to worry about 
the intrusive interest of the USSR, and on the issue of volunteers, there has been 
correspondence between the opposition of the US president and manifest Arab aversion. 
However, in Hungary the blood continues to flow. The Soviet repression takes more and more 
brutal forms (shootings, deportations). The unpopularity of the Kadar government grows, 
while the chances of stabilizing the situation to the Polish level decrease.This situation not 
only upsets the world's conscience, but the USSR loses much sympathy among its traditional 
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supporters. 
In addition, happening after the problems in Poland, the Hungarian tragedy illustrates the 
failure of the communist regime on its own ground of choice, that of the realization of worker 
welfare. The panegyric of the socialist regime which covers several ... 52 the statement is 
actually an advocacy. Secondly, after using the most brutal military force in Hungary, after 
proclaiming to want to use force to crush the attack on Egypt, after having raised the specter 
of a third world war with the use of remote-controlled machines and nuclear weapons, the 
Soviet Union feels the need to present itself again as an advocate of peace and proponent of 
the solution through the negotiations of all international disputes. It has to return to the issue 
for which it has shown little interest in the past few months, but which it knows holds a 
seductive power over the people, as well as on the most diverse personalities and circles. We 
must expect, without a doubt, that the Soviet initiative causes an new offensive of peace 
movements and similar groups. 
The affirmation of this desire for peace and disarmament joins strangely to a huge pride of 
power that betrays the allusion to the possibility that the USSR would have had in 1945 and 
that it would have again today, in better conditions, to overcome the rest of Europe with its 
tanks. 
Thirdly, the concrete proposals presented regarding disarmament are discussed in section 3 of 
your telegram n°4937.  
For my part, I will only mention the following: 
These proposals in general, repeat the formulas presented by the USSR for eighteen months, 
if possible, in an even more absurd and more demagogic way. They go even farther than the 
great program presented on May 10th, 1955, to the extent that the Soviet government, while 
reiterating its demands for the complete destruction of all atomic stocks and total liquidation 
of foreign bases without geographical limitations, does not recognize – more than anything – 
that an effective system of control requires the prior establishment of a climate of trust. 
In the field of the actual strength stationing in Germany, it should be noted that the USSR 
suggests only a one-third reduction in the immediate. This reserve betrays its unease about the 
total evacuation at the time in which it faces many difficulties in the people's democracies. 
The only part of the statement which seems positive concerns the Eisenhower plan on an 
aerial inspection. The USSR is willing to examine a proposal for a local application of this 
plan to a depth of 800 km on each side of the dividing line between the West and the East. It 
had therefore welcomed with coldness a similar project when Mr. Jules Moch had evoked it in 
the course of his negotiations. There is, however, an element that seems destined to seduce a 
part of American opinion. 
Fourth, concerning the various proposed conferences, one more time, the USSR presents 
                                                             
52 Gap of decryption. 
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projects that it knows are impossible to realize. It can not ignore that at the present time, 
President Eisenhower refuses even a three-party conference at the highest level. So there are 
considerations of tactics and propaganda that inspire primarily these proposals. 
However, we can't forget that the Soviet Union is currently dealing with the most serious 
problems. Whether it's Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, the connection of issues that concern all 
of these countries, their impact on relations with the other people's democracies, including 
China, or the course of the German and Polish problems, the future of the Stalinist empire is 
at stake. The time is no longer such that the dictator could resolve crises of this nature by 
convening in Moscow the Communist leaders who could have choice only between 
submission and elimination. In these conditions, it is possible to wonder whether, after doing 
what it had to do for several days to bring the situation to the extreme and to make acute the 
threat of armed intervention, the USSR does not consider more prudent at the present time, to 
move the events to a political and diplomatic level. 
Additionally, in this situation, the USSR has an interest to prevent the "coup of Budapest" 
from causing the armaments of the Western powers from creating effects comparable to those 
that had caused the "Prague coup" and the Korean War, the consequences for the entire 
economic and social policy of these effects would be more difficult to bear at the present. 
It seems to me indicated to adopt a more flexible behavior that the department suggests in 
order not to leave the USSR to raise the political and moral benefit of its maneuver, and at the 
same time not to neglect any opportunity to defuse the dangers of the current tension. 
 
 
 
 
Document 63 
Report of Mr. Dejean, Ambassador of France in Moscow to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – November 20 1956 
 
CABLE 204 
Mr. Dejean, Ambassador of France in Moscow, 
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
T. n° 4671 to 4675. 
Reserved. 
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Moscow, November 20th, 1956, 2.15pm. 
(Received: 12.15am) 
 
During the interview that is contained in my telegram n°4583, the Ambassador of Sweden 
said to Mr. Khrushchev that the intervention of Soviet troops in Hungary causes in his 
country, as in the rest of the world, deep emotion and it will affect the relations between 
Sweden and the USSR. Global opinion was certain, in fact, that it was the whole Hungarian 
people, and not just some counter-revolutionary, who would be relieved to obtain the 
departure of Soviet troops and recover its independence. 
The first secretary of the party said that he was aware of the effect produced on global 
opinion. The absence of the NATO representatives during the evening recalled the era when 
there was no contact between the Soviet world and the West. But the USSR had alreadyover 
come this isolation once. It would now yet overcome the current crisis. 
For us it was very difficult, continued Mr. Khrushchev, to make the decision to send our 
troops into Hungary, but we could not act otherwise. The reactionary elements had begun to 
chase and massacre the communists and other progressives and attack our troops. 
Withdrawing our forces in these conditions would result in a loss of political and military 
prestige. It was inadmissible. Moreover, it was evident that the uprising was not only directed 
against those such elements which were particularly compromised. It wanted to destroy the 
very foundations of people's democracy. In these conditions, our intervention was required. 
Moreover, it is exaggerated to speak, for Hungary, of a popular uprising. Addressing the 
Ambassador of Finland, Mr. Khrushchev has emphasized the difference between the 
resistance of the Finnish people to the Soviet troops in 1940 and the events that are taking 
place in Hungary. In Finland, we had realized that we had against us all the Finnish people 
and that it was a real national war. This is not the case of Hungary because we had controlled 
the insurgency in just three days. 
According to Mr. Khrushchev, the Soviet government had the most liberal intentions with 
regard to Hungary; as soon as the Kadar government is in good shape, the Soviet government 
will be willing to withdraw its troops. The issues of the Warsaw Pact and of Hungary's 
eventual neutrality were more complex. But the Soviet government intended to examine them 
later if that was the desire of a Hungarian Government animated by friendly feelings towards 
the USSR. 
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Document 64 
Note from the sub-directorate of Eastern Europe. Reactions to the events in Hungary –
November 20 1956 
 
CABLE 207 
Note from the sub-directorate of Eastern Europe 
Reactions to the events in Hungary 
 
Paris, November 20th, 1956. 
 
Introduction. 
The development of the Hungarian Revolution and its destruction by the Red Army are 
among the most important events in the post-war era. Their consequences are far from being 
exhausted. However, the creation of divergence between different communist parties around 
them already appears as a threat which could split communist and progressive movements. 
This is the reason why Moscow tries to take care of the situation through a set of concessions, 
at least apparent, and forceful measurements. 
It is therefore necessary, for the countries concerned, to observe the following guidelines: 
 
A. INITIATIVES TAKEN BY MOSCOW: 
In its relations with the satellite countries and Yugoslavia. 
Declaration of October 30th. 
Its implementation, for example, in the Polish-Soviet talks the recall of Marshal Rokossovsky 
from his position. 
The justification for intervention in Hungary. 
 
B. LOCAL REACTIONS: 
Satellites, China, Yugoslavia, P.C. foreigners, India. 
1° Attitude more or less favorable, from  leaders and from public opinion, about the events in 
Hungary. 
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2° Call for vigilance and implementation of safety mechanisms. 
3° Concessions made to local opinion. 
a. Economic measures. 
Provisions made to raise the standard of living of the population, possibly by reducing the 
pace of investment; dissolution of joint companies, especially for uranium exploitation; repair 
injustices; problem of Polish coal. 
b. Psychological measures. 
Suppression of the Soviet influence, the compulsory nature of the teaching of Russian 
language and Marxism-Leninism. 
c. Effort to make less apparent Soviet control: departure of military advisers; new status of 
troops in Poland; problem of the evacuation of troops from Hungary. 
 
 
Document 65 
Report of Mr. François Seydoux, Ambassador of France in Vienna to Mr. Pineau, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs – November 21 1956 
 
CABLE 211 
 
Mr. François Seydoux, Ambassador of France in Vienna,  
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
 
T. n 770 à 774.                                                                          Vienna, 21 November 1956, 
14h. 10.  
                                                                                                     (Received: 14h. 20.) 
 
 
Two news coming from Budapest retain, today, the attention of Vienna:  
1.  The position taken by the official body of the Hungarian communist party, which 
expresses openly the hope that the Soviets will withdraw their troops from Hungary and will 
thus allow the establishment between the two countries of relations based on friendship. The 
situation of Hungary is very different, adds the newspaper, to that of Poland. This country has, 
in fact, a border with Germany, whereas Hungary is surrounded only by friendly countries 
and by Austria.  
- 2. The declaration of Mr. Istvan Bibo, Minister of State in the former cabinet of Nagy, 
according to which only the following program could allow the end of the crisis:  
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1) Return to power of Imre Nagy; 
2) General amnesty for all those who “committed political offenses in good faith”; 
3) Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary within six weeks. 
4) Adoption of a constitution guaranteeing the functioning of a parliamentary and 
democratic system.  
5) Recognition of the agrarian reform, of nationalizations and freedom of thought. 
6) As regards foreign policy, Hungary would be presented the following alternative: to 
remain a member of the Warsaw Pact, provided that it loses its military character, 
transformed into consultative organization and that Yugoslavia forms part of it, or, 
denounce the pact and conclude with the USSR a treaty of non-aggression. Finally, 
Mr. Bibo declared that the sending of United Nations observers would not be 
necessary if Soviet troops withdrew. No allusion appears to have been made to 
elections.  
Such statements show that the Kadar government fails to impose its authority, 
while economic activity is still paralyzed.  
 
I note on the other hand that the number of the refugees greatly increased: 3,750 Hungarians 
crossed the border from Monday till Tuesday and more than 5,000 from Tuesday to 
Wednesday. 
Among the latter, most of whom had to crawl in swamps of Lake Neusiedl, there were 
wounded. According to some information, the Soviets, in fact, would shoot at the fugitives in 
the border area;  they would have killed an important proportion; we are talking about 20%. 
The increase of the stream of the refugees is doubtless due to the deportations made by the 
Soviets and the atmosphere which they create in Hungary. 
 
 
 
Document 66 
Report of Mr. Alphand, Ambassador of France in Washington to Mr. Pineau, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs – November 23 1956 
 
 
 
CABLE 224 
Mr. Alphand, Ambassador of France in Washington  
     To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
 
 
T. n° 7512-7513.                                                           Washington, November 23, 1956, 22h. 
10. 
                                                                                        (Received: November 24, 4h. 10.) 
 
 
The information received from Budapest indicates that the Kadar government is virtually a 
prisoner of the Russians. No interlocutor is admitted to be with the Hungarian Prime minister 
without the presence of several Soviet officers. The food situation would have improved in 
the Hungarian capital, but the population suffers cruelly from lack of fuel and gasoline. It is 
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confirmed here that the strike movement continues without disruption and that there is no 
indication of a decline in the popular will. The number of the refugees now exceeds 60,000. 
By way of example, the passage into Austria of all the teaching staff and of all the students of 
the University of Sopron. Although there is no intention of blaming for such an exodus, the 
fact remains that the Hungarian resistance forces will soon weaken.  
The State Department is not aware of the entry of new Soviet troops into Hungary nor of a 
concentration on the Yugoslav borders. The reports received from Belgrade indicate, 
however, that Marshal Tito is increasingly concerned about the Russian military threat.  
 
As to the fate of Imre Nagy, they consider, in Washington, that if he really is in Romania as 
per the Budapest radio announcement, he could only be deported by Soviet troops contrary to 
the commitments given to the Yugoslav government by Mr. Kadar. 
 
From the point of view of the State Department, the situation in Hungary remains extremely 
unclear and complex. They would see great advantage that Mr. Hammarskjold follow up on 
the project which he wasready to request to go for himself to the area to be aware of the 
situation.  
 
 
 
Document 67 
Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – November 26 1956 
 
CABLE 235 
Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest, 
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
T. n° 825-826. Reserved. 
Budapest, November 26, 1956. 3.36 pm, 3. 34 pm. 
(Received: 10.27 pm) 
 
I reply to your telegaram n° 1224. 
The secretary of this legation was able to speak this morning at the US legation to the 
Cardinal, who appeared in good physical and moral health despite his sadness and his 
isolation: to avoid the difficulties that might raise his presence to their legation, in fact, 
Americans prohibit him any outside contact;  the chargé d’affaires has insistently asked us not 
to spread news about the Cardinal.  
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As regards to his secretary, he attempted to reach Vienna in the company of journalists aboard 
a US convoy, probably on November 10, but he was arrested at Gyor by the Russians or by 
the Hungarian political police. From that moment, no one has heard from him. 
 
 
Document 68 
Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – November 27 1956 
 
 
CABLE 238 
Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest, 
To Mr Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
T. n° 828-830. 
Budapest, November 27, 1956. 6.20 pm. 
(Received: 9.39 pm) 
 
My Italian colleague has been consulted from Rome about the hypothesis contained in my 
telegrams n° 745 and n° 801 and which makes more real the diplomatic incident with 
Hungary, the USSR and Yugoslavia. Count Franco answered in the sense of this telegram.  
Like all my western colleagues and I, my Yugoslav colleague recommends the maintenance 
of diplomatic missions, but he considers inevitable his personal retreat if, as is likely, 
disappointing answers will come from Budapest to Belgrade’s protests; in any case, his 
mission here is over. 
My new American colleague doesn't see any possibility of presenting his credentials. If the 
heads of mission will not be withdrawn by agreement, he will have to find a way to disappear. 
My British colleague doesn't know more than me about the modification of his government's 
point of view. My Belgian and Dutch colleagues told me that they had expressed views to 
their governments that are similar to those of your telegram n°1084. In the event that Your 
Excellency might consider the withdrawal of the heads of mission, I would be grateful if you 
would let me temporarily withdraw in Vienna, my wife wants to improve upon, over the 
months to come, the assistance work that she has undertaken in accordance with local 
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representatives of the Red Cross and according to the line defined in my telegrams n°733 and 
770, however, it is based almost on car shuttles between Vienna and Budapest. 
 
 
Document 69 
Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – December 4 1956 
 
CABLE 257 
Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest, 
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
T.n° 857. 
 
Budapest, December 4, 1956. 
 
I met today, on December 4th, with my polish colleague returned from Warsaw where he had 
gone for a fortnight.  
After telling me that he had kept in constant touch with M. Kadar and the USSR ambassador, 
M. Willmann has exposed all the current problems. 
After having welcomed the regulation adopted in his country, the ambassador of Poland said 
to me that he was convinced that a political solution will be found in Hungary within two or 
three weeks. For now, the main thing was to restart production where the process is underway 
and where normalization will inevitably follow the political solutions. 
Mr.Willmann does not exclude at all that Nagy would be the spokesman of these changes, 
because his deployment in Romania with Lukacs and Losonczy (they are staying in Sinaia) is 
less a deportation than a stay in a reflection room. The failure of the workers' councils 
negotiations with the government does not mean anything, because in the long run they will 
represent a force and a symbol of which the Soviet Union will be obliged to take into account, 
and the ambassador maintains close relationships with them. 
As regard the rural population, it is clear to him that its evolution is entirely parallel to that of 
the Polish rural population. The same aversion to the forced co-operatives, the same 
persistence of the good cooperative and the same irremediable collapse of the bad. The 
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principle of the elimination of the compulsory delivery seems accepted; by these concessions, 
a certain social peace can be maintained in the countryside. 
One of the essential elements of a political solution will be the future economic regime of 
Hungary, and Mr. Willmann has implied that a Western orientation seems excluded, but 
nevertheless, Russia and the People's Democracies could make loans and a generous aid. 
From now on, Russian aid would be extremely important (something that seems to me so 
much confirmed by official statements and direct testimonies including wagons, food…). 
Poland has granted a loan of 100 million zlotys, including important carbon shipments, and 
delegated hundred students in Szeged to get in touch with Hungarian students. No doubt that 
they will sympathize. 
Overall, the Polish people are generous with the Hungarian people in the present events. As 
regards the government of Warsaw, it considers that the Hungarian affair is a matter of pure 
domestic policy and that it would not be possible to interfere without inconvenience for the 
Hungarians and for himself. 
Speaking about the projected visit of Hammarskjold in Hungary, Mr. Willmann, relying on 
the official reply, stated that it was not feasible at present, but no doubt possible at some time 
(the radio announces that Mr. Hammarskjold will travel to Budapest on December 16th). 
As regards the possibility of a relatively close political solution, I notice that the statement 
published after the Romanian-Soviet negotiations concludes that: "There is no doubt that 
similar negotiations will be held with other countries of the socialist gcamp." 
However, we have to take into account the distortion in the talk of the Polish Ambassador, 
which must have settled on his mind because of the Polish–Russian settlement on November 
18 which he evidently sees as the basis of a future agreement between the USSR and 
Hungary. This hypothesis is plausible to a certain extent, but it is not a certainty. 
 
 
 
Document 70 
Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – December 6 1956 
 
CABLE 266 
Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest, 
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
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D. n° 1122. 
Budapest, December 6, 1956. 
 
I have the honor to present to the Ministry in an annex some passages from an editorial in 
Nepszabadsag of December 2nd, 1956 on the difficulties of rebuilding the party. Then we go 
to the heart of the problem: after arresting Nagy last week, after putting aside easily workers 
'demands, after the suppression of revolutionary committees, the main idea now is to raise the 
“workers' socialist party”, and the press is full of reports of modest victories in some region 
and in some factory. 
For those who perform the daily drudgery of reading the new Hungarian press, there is no 
doubt that the old nightmares not...those remaining of the revolution in a scenario of Russian 
tanks and with the presence, today, of numerous disguised policemen. 
But the guiding element of the party is no longer the same. This editorial of Nepszabadsag, 
what admission of weakness! What inability to renew! After seventy years of parliamentary 
republic, the French flout the vice-prefect’s talks willingly, but retain some amused sympathy. 
In this communist newspaper on the contrary, boredom only gives way to distrust; it's clear 
that the militant of 1945 is no more than a creature of habit, divided between the concern of 
his position and the fear of the indignation of his own. The press has lost the right tone of 
hope and it's in Budapest that you can better measure how communism has aged. We are far 
from the years 1945, 1946, 1947, when the most avid reactionary was not so sure, in the 
depths of his conscience, that the party was not in the process of building socialism and would 
achieve something. 
Nowadays the legal country does not mask the real country any more and the choruses of 
Nepszabadsag have lost their grip on youth.  
For the latter, communism has ceased to be a truth, before becoming perhaps a civilization. 
This is the youth who greets the most frantically Western cars, that runs away clandestinely to 
Austria, it is the youth that has taken up arms.  We can say that these guys don't know what 
they want, they definitely know what they don't want: in their spirit, foreign occupation and 
economic exploitation, arbitrariness, the secret police, press under control, cohabiting like 
black beasts with large landowners or large industrial employers. We are in 1848, with 
Human Rights and social claims, not to mention the revival of nationalism. As in 1848, the 
mass feels a deep respect for intellectuals: before resuming their negotiations with Kadar, the 
delegates of the workers' Councils have created a relation with a Committee of lawyers, that 
work hard; but there is a lack of maturity in this. However, it's to give hope to the supporters 
of the marxist theory of historical development. 
In addition to this, the most superficial observation betrays the embarrassment of the 
Russians, who are no longer what they are in Warsaw and Berlin. During the feminine 
demonstration on December 4th, the soldiers had to repel the protesters, guns blazing. 
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Therefore, sometimes, you could see a group of young girls get over the cordon laughing, 
without other reaction of the Russians except a head nod. A ten-year experience contains the 
fear they inspire within the limits of reality. 
On the other side of the street, our military attaché meets his Soviet colleague who also 
considers the show, and with all military frankness he said to him:"You know that we 
withdrew from Indochina; here, do not you realize that no one can see you; you'd better 
leave". Colonel Kojanov was incapable of imagining a minimal response to this statement 
without reruns and the most profound signs of dismay could be read on his face. Once again, 
this is something different to the Stalinist Era.  
In fact, it is likely that the Communist Party will have difficulties in reconstituting itself, that 
its new members do not demonstrate zeal at all, and that maybe it won't find again its 
impulsion 
 
 
Annexed: Report of The place of the Communists is the Hungarian Socialist Workers' 
Party (editorial) – December 2 1956 
 
ANNEXED 
 
Nepszabadsag, December 2nd, 1956 
 
The place of the Communists is in the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (editorial) 
 
The Hungarian communist movement is in a difficult, grievous situation. The Rakosi-Gero 
group has seriously compromised, in the eyes of the working class people, the objectives, the 
sacred ideas of our party. The counter-revolution tries to make the Hungarian communist 
movement responsible for any crime, for all acts committed against the people of this group. 
We haven't had to deal only with the agitation of the counter-revolution, but also the bloody 
counter-revolutionary terror that has hit the Hungarian communist movement. 
In such a situation, the main objective is to organize the Communist ranks, reorganizing the 
party, get rid of past mistakes, the bad practice. The party of the communists lives and 
organizes. The bodies of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party are formed gradually in the 
country, and have started, though with little effect for the moment, political work and 
organization.  
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Many communists, nowadays, do not take part in the work of the party. Sometimes they do 
not enter the party and pursue a wait and see policy. What is the reason for this? 
… One thing prevents particularly comrades to take part in this work: they are afraid that, 
sooner or later, the old criminal leadershipappears in the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. 
They think that nowadays, it is just the slogan "Normalize Life", and that when this will be 
realised, the evil will start again from the beginning. Of course, not just the communists are 
afraid of this, but also all those who care about the cause of the building of socialism. 
Numerous radio and foreign newspapers announce consciously, day after day, false news 
intended to make people believe that a Rakosist restoration takes place in the party. So it's in 
this way, for example, the rumor that Oscar Betlen, the old editor who was seriously 
compromised, was writing Nepszabadsag, leaked out. There is not a word of truth in this. 
… It is that it does not satisfy. They are demanding the removal of other people and some 
wish to exclude from their workplace the old officials of the P.T.H. They are talking about 
nothing less than persecution, which hides the obvious intention of the counterrevolution: the 
communists excluded from public life. 
Alas! Some of our comrades don't understand that the persecution of the old officials of the 
party is something profoundly unjust. It must not be forgotten that after 1953, in the party, the 
resistance against the Rakosi-Gero band has been strengthened and developed to the point that 
several members and officials of the party came into open opposition with the leadership of 
that period and requested the exclusion of leaders who had broken away from the people... 
A characteristic fact has happened in these days. The party is reintegrating into the work of 
production numerous officials of the party who had been suspended recently. An old official 
introduced himself as a stocker at a hospital in Budapest. They would have hired him, but 
when they saw in his work book that was an official of the party, they said that they didn't 
need him. It is nothing but a new form of the famous blacklist of our time. There is no 
difference between that and the vile methods of Horthy's secret police.  
Others see a danger in the fact that we were able to solve the counterrevolutionary coup with 
the help of the Soviet armed forces and they believe that the old leaders, being the enemy of 
people, leaning on the Soviet armed forces, will return one day. This anguish is also fueled by 
the slanders of the enemy, according to which a Stalinist restoration would take place in the 
USSR. It is completely impossible that the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party, who have 
mercilessly revealed to the whole world the criminal activities of Stalin, they themselves 
commit the same mistakes. A proof of this is, for example, the result of the Polish-Soviet 
negotiations recently published. The agreement is an open condemnation of the past, and puts 
the relations between the USSR and Poland on a new basis of the principles for which the 
Hungarian communists and the Hungarian people fought and are fighting. An article appeared 
in the last Sunday number of Pravda and it condemned the criminal activities of the Rakosi-
Gero band and openly declared that the USSR doesn't want to repeat the mistakes committed 
by Stalin in the relations between states ... These facts prove wrong those who see in the 
Soviet army a force that is preparing the return of Rakosi-Gero band … 
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The ranks of our party are still a little tight. It will not get as many members as the P.T.H. We 
need neither  upstarts or careerists, nor those who served everyone , regardless of their beliefs. 
But the party needs the longtime Communist, tested, hardened, capable, in the difficult 
situations of today, to smooth the path of development, to advance the recovery of normal life. 
 
 
Document 71 
Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – December 7 1956 
 
 
CABLE 271 
Mr. Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest, 
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
T. n° 875 
Budapest, December 7, 1956. 
 
It is surprising to note how much the streets of Budapest suffer the influence of the UN 
debates. The feminine demonstrations of 4th, 5th and 6th had to keep on toes the international 
opinion. It's possible to wonder if the reference to December 15th of the demonstrations and 
protest scheduled for December 6th and 7th was decided in the light of the planned and then 
cancelled visit of Mr. Hammarskjold to Budapest: in fact, the posters that established the 
appointment on 15th  were ready in December 4th, while this visit was announced on 5th. 
In general and if I may give an opinion on the nature of our work at the UN in the Hungarian 
debate, it seems that we had interest in maintaining a constant pressure on the USSR, 
pressure, for example, may have had some effect on the pace of the deportations; but it's 
better not to encourage exaggerated hopes in Hungarian opinion, not only in consideration of 
lives needlessly sacrificed here, but also because our eventual failures would risk jeopardizing 
the credit of the Western powers. 
 
 
 
112 
 
Document 72 
Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – December 10 1956 
 
CABLE 280 
Mr. Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest, 
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
T. n°885 
 
Budapest, December 10, 1956. 
 
Ignoring how the telegrams, that the telegraphic center has not returned to me, without 
transmitting came to the Ministry, I list here the events of the end of the week.  
a. It has become a test of strength; the fracture underlined in my telegram n°832 caused, 
refusing Kadar any concession and going back on his earlier promises, an ultimatum from the 
central organ of workers' councils that expired the day before yesterday, Saturday at 8pm, and 
has again placed on the government responsibilities of new bloodshed. 
b. Going beyond, the "government" has made public the resolutions dating back to mid-week 
and adopted by a "Provisional Central Committee" of the new formation of the Hungarian 
communist party (of which we assume that it behaves exactly like the “Central Committee”); 
the composition of this provisional central committee has not been disclosed until now and it 
is assumed that it was hardly different, at the moment, from the government's team headed by 
Kadar. 
Translations of the second, third and fourth parts of these resolutions come to the Ministry in 
n°1129/EU, 1130/IP by this letter. Giving these events a tendentious explanation to the point 
of touching the absurdity, these texts have no other immediate purpose than purging, if it's 
possible, the “counterrevolutionary members” of the workers' councils and introducing in 
these some elements which Russian-Hungarian authorities can lean on. 
c. Yesterday, Sunday, the central authority of the workers' councils decided a general 48-hour 
strike starting this evening at midnight on Monday; the police entered forthwith in the area of 
deliberations, while the Russians surrounded the building. About sixty people were arrested 
and detained up to 17 hours at the police prefecture. Released all at this time, except for two 
of them, the members of the central committee of the workers' councils recover their place, 
where an A.V.H colonel arrives to give them a reading of a "statement", translated in 
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n°1126/EU by this mail; despite the provisions of the Decree of November 13th (see my 
Report n° 1054/EU) which provided "the most intense participation of workers to the exercise 
of power," the activities of workers' councils become illegal when they come out of the 
context of the enterprises that they manage. This has practically dissolved the central and 
provincial organisms of the workers' councils. 
d. The decrees, in due form, establish, starting tomorrow December 11th, the martial law 
against all those who will be found in possession of weapons without a special permit. 
Characteristic of the little confidence that Russian-Hungarian authority has in  the elements 
that recruits, is the fact that the newly created militias are not exempt from this legislation, 
their exception from regarding the application of it is only delayed by one day. 
 
  
Document 73 
Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – December 11 1956 
 
CABLE 287 
Mr. Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest, 
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
T. n° 889-890. 
 
Budapest, December 11th, 1956, 10.10 am. 
(Received: on 13th, 5.49 pm) 
 
I read in the telegram from New York n° 2529 that the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs said 
to the UN General Assembly that the government of Imre Nagy, "before it was overwhelmed 
by the reactionary elements", had proposed itself the intervention of Soviet armed forces. 
The underlined words show that it is not about the counterattack of November 4th in the 
capital, but the start of the Russian armed intervention on the night between 23th and 24th 
October. 
Or, this started in Budapest around midnight at the latest, when an armored division begun to 
cross Szeged two or three hours before; it is at 4:30 am that the official radio of the regime 
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revealed that he had appealed to the Soviet forces; it is only at 8.10 am that the same radio 
spread the news of the designation of Imre Nagy, by the Central Committee still manned at 
this time by Gero, and it's at 12:10 am that for the first time the new prime minister took the 
floor, by microphone. 
 
 
Document 74 
Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – December 13 1956 
 
CABLE 293 
 
Mr. Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest, 
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
 
D. n° 1149 
 
Budapest, December 13th, 1956. 
 
The attached notes of the cultural attaché in this legation oppose this impotence of the 
associations of Hungarian intellectuals of "over 30 years", the dynamism of which continues 
to show a youth who  hid their weapons during the first ten days of November, in order to 
better continue the resistance clandestinely.. 
Among the observations of Mr. Turbet-Delof, I welcome especially the fact that the thousands 
of students who provoked the initial events of the revolution, continue to be the leaders of a 
movement only – to the extent that the camaraderie of the fighting has integrated them into 
workers' youth of which many students were also made part because of their family origins. 
The fundamental revelation of the first days of the national uprising, in late October, remains 
the unbridled opposition to the workers' regime that Gero still believed, on the evening of 
October 23th , in calling to his aid. As well as the intellectual revolutionary committees, now 
dissolved, which subordinated in recent times their resistance to that of the workers' councils 
with whom Kadar was grappled, there is also a youth for at least half originating from 
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working-class or rural backgrounds who has carried out the illegal tasks confidentially 
reported by Mr. Turbet-Delof. 
 
Annex: Note from the cultural attaché – December 11 1956 
 
ANNEX 
 
Note from the cultural attaché 
(Strictly confidential) 
 
N. n° L/146/56 
Budapest, December 11th, 1956. 
 
The three notes that I have dedicated to the "political behavior of the Hungarian intelligentsia" 
(n° L/138/56 of November 27, L/141/56 of 1 December and L/ 145/56 of 10 December) 
concern essentially the intellectuals of "over 30 years" grouped in organizations that, existing 
before the revolution, formed, from October 26th, the "revolutionary committees” gathered, 
from November 20th, by the "revolutionary Council of the Hungarian intelligentsia". I have 
indicated how these committees and the council, declared illegal by December 5th, exercise 
again, in different forms, an activity that the government seems to tolerate to the extent that it 
has slowed. I learned, for example, that at the time of the search made on December 5th at the 
headquarters of the Revolutionary Council, the police seized the stock of mimeographed 
documents that was there: it seems that, from this date, this  council accepted to be deprived 
of every type of expression. 
The situation is quite different in the youth. 
On October 23th, Budapest counted 25,000 students. Many of these, originating from the 
province, have returned home and others took refuge abroad so that the number of students 
who are currently in Budapest must not exceed 10,000. This numerical decrease of actual 
students is compensated by elements from two social categories: 
1. Young intellectuals who have recently completed their university studies (that is the “new 
intelligentsia” of my note of September 14th, 1956, Chapter 1). 
2. Young workers maintaining with students fraternity created during the fighting. 60% of the 
students were from working-class or rural backgrounds by virtue of the  people's democracy 
116 
 
policy on higher education intake, it is not uncommon to see the workers and students having 
between them more or less close links of parentage. 
Unlike the ''old intelligentsia", this Youth that called itself "the fourth generation ", and has 
avoided giving credit to the Kadar policy by organizing itself in committees located on the 
street. By the end of the fighting, it entered the underground resistance in the form of small 
groups, whose working rules are the following: 
1. Absence of central management, to avoid the brutal beheading of the organization; 
2. Controlled contacts among groups, so that what is respected, in all possible ways, is the 
principle of division of labor. 
The groups were brought to specialize, for the current period, in the following skills: 
1. Drafting and copying flyers and newspapers. There was also a clandestine newspaper, 
Élünk (“We live”) up to December 4th, the day when members of its editors were arrested in a 
car in which were found weapons and a copy machine; 
2. Collection and installation, for use of the archives and libraries of Hungary and of other 
countries, of all handwritten, photocopied, printed, photographic documents, etc., if 
concerning the revolution; 
3. Transmission abroad of the main revolutionary documents through the intermediary of 
refugees and Western legations; 
4. A telephone information system to be aware of what is happening in different areas of the 
capital and possibly alert the Western legations (this was the case on November 5th, when 
some students of Bersenyi Street were arrested); 
5. Agitation on public roads . The "fourth generation" claims a part in the organization of the 
demonstrations that began on December 4th, in particular those of December 6th in front of the 
West station; 
6. Surveillance of the stations, railway tracks and roads in order to report concentrations and 
departures of deportees. 
7. Armed commandos for the liberation of the latter. My informant - one of the most gifted 
and serious of my old students - says that this kind of operation was several times successful. 
For Budapest, all of these groups of permanent activities would represent between two and 
three thousand young people. Five or six thousand mobilized would constitute a reserve in 
case of a “hard strike”. 
After that, the youth have got back the contacts that were interrupted because of my absence 
from November 13th to 25th, I hope to be able now to transmit to the Ministryregular and 
firsthand information that concerns it.  
117 
 
P.S. The newspaper Nepszabadsag of December 7th, under the title "The troublemakers, the 
provocateurs of the uprising and the receivers of stolen weapons have been arrested", 
published a statement from the National Police Headquarters announcing, among other things, 
the arrest of "Gyula Obersovski, a 29-year-old journalist, who prepared and spread leaflets, 
entitled Élünk". We can read in the same statement: "in the sixth district, the police stopped a 
car and confiscated, from four bandits, three guns with 250 cartridges and a copy machine." 
This official information confirms what I mentioned earlier, on page 2, fourth paragraph from 
the bottom of the page. 
 
 
Document 75 
Report of Mr. Francfort, Minister of France in Bucharest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – December 13 1956 
 
CABLE 294 
Mr. Francfort, Minister of France in Bucharest,  
     To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affaires  
 
  
D. n° 1002.                                                                                             Bucharest, 13 December 
1956.  
 
 
 
One of my employees just had a conversation with a Hungarian official about the current 
feelings of some Hungarians even from official circles.  
This official, who during these last months, has always shown moderation and pleasant 
disposition towards the legation, considers that the present Hungarian government must 
endeavour to increase its popularity, giving the ministries not yet filled to personalities who 
are more representative of public opinion.  
In particular, it would be preferable that some of the people, who accompanied Mr. Imre 
Nagy in Romania, can enter into the government. It didn’t seem to him that Professor Bibo, 
whose name was announced by the Western press, must enter into the government.  
The economic situation in Hungary is extremely difficult, each day of strike the country loses, 
he said, 300 million forints.  
As regards Romanian aid, naturally he didn’t think that Romania could supply cereals to 
Hungary nor much more petroleum products, but he hoped above all that Hungary would 
receive chemicals and timber.  
 
Like all Hungarians, this interlocutor doesn’t manifest a special sympathy for the Romanians. 
He maintained relations of sympathy with Mr. Moghioros because this one, of Magyar ethnic 
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origin, member of Politburo and Vice-President of the Cabinet, was the defender of the 
Hungarian minority within the government. We couldn’t say as much of Mr. Ladislav Banyai, 
new Vice-Minister of Education, who shows himself more Rumanian than the Rumanians. As 
my collaborator pointed out, undoubtedly the nomination of Mr. Banyai couldn’t increase the 
popularity of the regime among the students of Cluj, he was answered: “it is the same for the 
Romanian leaders, they have chosen a tough policy“. 
 
Questioned about Hungary’s relations with neighbouring countries, this official indicated that 
the Hungarian “people” had now more sympathy for “peoples” such as the Yugoslav people 
and the Polish people which had a national policy than for the others, that is to say the 
Romanians and the Czechs.  
 
On the terms of the Soviet-Polish communiqué, different in the tone from those of the Soviet-
Romanian communiqué, he declared: “This is thedifference that characterizes the position of 
peoples who make a national policy and that of the others”. 
As regards to the number of the Hungarian minority in Romania, the indications of the census 
(telegram n° 963/EU of 3 December 1956) would be lower than the reality. There are more 
than two million Hungarians in Romania (official census figure: 1,550,000). 
In particular, for the city of Bucharest, the census announces 11,000 Hungarian; according the 
President of the Romanian Presidium, Mr. Groza, himself, there are 80,000 Hungarians in 
Bucharest and, according to the Hungarian Legation, about 200,000. Except in the Ministries 
of Forestry and the Chemical Industry, the government will not leave to the Hungarians the 
place which they are owed. 
The conversation ended by an anecdote. As we pointed out to a Szekler that in his village 
there was no more than one Hungarian for three Romanians, the man replied: “it doesn’t 
matter: a Hungarian is well worth three Romanians”.  
Such must be today – more than ever – the feeling of the Hungarian people towards the 
Romanian “brother” people. 
 
 
Document 76 
Report of Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the diplomatic representatives of 
France in New York (O.N.U.), Washington, London, Moscow, Prague, Vienna, Bonn, 
Warsaw, Bucharest, Berlin, Belgrade, Sofia, Rome – December 14 1956 
 
CABLE 295 
 
Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs,  
      To the diplomatic representatives of France to New York (UN),  
       Washington, London, Moscow, Prague, Vienna, Bonn, Warsaw, 
       Bucharest, Berlin, Belgrade, Sofia, Rome, 
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T. n° 5618-5619; 14126-14127;                                                   Paris, 14 December 1956, 
19h. 45.          
     13874-13875; 5515-5516; 
     1552; 1414; 3913; 1837; 963;  
     1246; 1466; 826; 2420.  
 
 
According the indications communicated by telephone this morning by Mr. Jean Paul-
Boncour, the situation in Hungary remains chaotic and we still don’t see how could they 
break the deadlock. 
 
However, Kadar has demonstrated some manoeuvring skill. Owing to lack of transport, the 
peasants have difficulty in supplying the city with their agricultural products. The strikes have 
become unpopular. Moreover, the efforts of the insurgents, which have taken the last days, a 
spectacular aspect, without a doubt cannot renew themselves for a long time. These factors 
must not escape the Soviets who await signs of fatigue to attempt to overcome the crisis. It is 
not impossible that they are trying to put back on track personalities that they temporarily 
removed from traffic. 
 
In any case, it seems that Kadar himself is definitely compromised regarding the Hungarian 
people.  
 
 
Document 77 
Report of Mr. François Seydoux, Ambassador of France in Vienna to Mr. Pineau, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs – December 17 1956 
 
CABLE 299 
Mr. François Seydoux, Ambassador of France in Vienna,  
      To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs.  
 
 
T. n°960 to 963. Priority.                                                          Vienna, 17 December 1956, 
20h. 15.     
      Reserved.                                                                                                     (Received: 20h. 
25)  
 
 
 
According to the information received during the last forty-eight hours, the situation in 
Hungary is characterized at the beginning of this week by the following lines:  
 
1° The Kadar government is being ignored by the Hungarian population; it is supported only 
by the officials of the communist party and by the members of the political police. The 
workers reject it unanimously. 
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2° In Budapest, the Soviet troops are quite numerous so as to make order reign by the 
constraint. Almost all factories are occupied by troopsof the Red Army.  
 
3° The direction of the resistance movement has shifted to the provinces and particularly to 
mining regions.  
The spokesmen of workers in the underground industry, who sit “somewhere in Hungary”, 
have published a manifesto expressing their refusal to pursue any negotiations with the 
government of Budapest. 
The day when a new ministry is formed, the mining delegates will subordinate any 
resumption of conversations to the release of the persons arrested since 4 November and the 
evacuation of mining districts by the State police and by the Soviet troops. The manifesto 
ends with the affirmation of unwavering will of resistance of minors, who will destroy the 
installations rather than bowing in front of Kadar and the Russians. 
 
4° If, generally “order reigns in Budapest”, skirmishes have nevertheless taken place in the 
suburbs last Friday and Saturday. In the provinces, in the regions of Miskolcz, Sikonda, 
Zahony and Pecs, partisans remain very active. At various locations and in particular close to 
the Ukrainian border, several hundred Russian deserters have joined the Hungarians.  
 
5° The food situation seems to be getting worse. For the first time since 4th November, 
refugees told us that they had left Hungary from fear of famine. 
 
 
Document 78 
Report of Mr. Dejean, Ambassador of France in Moscow to Mr. Pineau Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – December 22 1956 
 
 
CABLE 318 
Mr. Dejean, Ambassador of France in Moscow,  
     To Mr. Pineau Minister of Foreign Affairs.  
 
 
T. n° 5085 to 5090.                                                                Moscow, 22 December 1956, 18 
h. 20.  
Urgent. Reserved.                                                                                                (Received: 18h. 
45.) 
 
 
 
 
I am referring to my telegram n° 5002.  
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1° I had this morning, 22 December, a meeting with Mr. Menon, Ambassador of India to the 
USSR who, retained in Moscow by illness, will  return to Budapest only on the 24 December.  
During the two-hour conversation that he had 12 December with Mr. Chepilov, the Indian 
diplomat didn’t hide to the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs the very painful impression that 
he had obtained from his stay in Hungary. He insisted a lot on the disastrous effect that the 
intervention of the Soviet army against the Hungarian population had produced in the Asian 
countries. Until then, these countries saw gladly in the USSR the champion of peace and 
settlement of all disputes by negotiation. This trust was today seriously shaken. 
 
Mr. Chepilov appeared to have not fully realized this situation. He claimed that world opinion 
was misinformed. He supported, by all sorts of arguments, the notion of the fascist counter-
revolution, in cooperation with certain bodies of subversion of Western powers. 
 
He gave as a proof the skill that the insurgents had shown in street fights; he evoked the 
10.000 Horthystes who would have been trained in an American camp in West Germany and 
introduced in Hungary; he recalled that under admiral Horthy, the Hungarian fascist party 
counted a million members of eight million inhabitants. It was then only more necessary to 
completely extinguish the fascist foyer which had re-formed in that country.  
 
2° The minister asked the ambassador what political solution he considered possible.  
Mr. Menon highlighted the great popularity which is accorded to Imre Nagy. He said that it 
was too late, and that this had been at the end of October-beginning of November overtaken 
by the events.  But that he kept his prestige in the eyes of the masses. In another phase, he 
could, in the absence of any character benefiting from any esteem, play a useful role.  
Mr. Chepilov reacted neither in a sense nor in another one as regards to a possible appeal to 
Imre Nagy. He restricted himself to underlining, that, above all, it was necessary to restore 
order. Only then we could think of a political solution of compromise.  
 
3° Mr. Menon came back from Budapest convinced that the Hungarian population is, in its 
immense majority, deeply hostile to communism and the Soviet occupying power. He reckons 
that, however indispensable, that Hungary will obtain, at least for a time, a regime similar to 
that of Gomulka. According to him, the only valid representatives of the Hungarian popular 
will, that is the leaders of the labour councils and certain organizations like the association of 
writers would understand this  well. The Ambassador confirmed to me that these men stood 
for a truly socialist regime and that they would be prepared to accept, on a temporary basis, 
the maintenance of Soviet forces stationed in Hungary before the crisis, the complete 
evacuation to be obtained subsequently by negotiation.  
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Document 79 
Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest to Mr. Pineau, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs – December 22 1956 
 
CABLE 320 
Mr. Paul-Boncour, Minister of France in Budapest, 
To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
T. n° 937, 938.  
 
Budapest, December 22nd, 1956, 12.10 am, 12.15 am. 
(Received: on December 23th, 5.08 pm, 1.26 pm) 
 
My British colleague complains that London would not seem to consider his personal 
suggestions for a quick UN intervention. 
Mr. Fry is one that would see gladly Mr. Hammarskjold land, without notice, at the airport of 
the capital, even at the cost of causing bloody clashes in the area, on the assumption that the 
Soviet fighter plane fails to divert the Secretary General to another landing zone. 
I no longer agree with my colleague that the two experts appointed by the Secretary General 
for the study of the Hungarian dossier come to  Vienna, failing to go to Belgrade or Prague. 
Austria has turned out to be, in fact, a hotbed of rumors that are largely locally built-up or 
completed .  
But why don't the experts of the Secretary General convene in Geneva a selection of serious 
informants to hire some of the Hungarian refugees who are flowing into Western Europe or 
the staff already dismissed from the International Red Cross? The possibility will also open to 
the Russian-Hungarian authority that it can send some qualified informants to Geneva. 
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Document 80 
Report of Mr. De Guiringaud, Deputy Head of the Permanent Mission of France to 
United Nations to Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs – December 29 1956 
 
CABLE 331 
Mr. de Guiringaud, Deputy head of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations,  
      To Mr. Pineau, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
 
T. n° 3436 to 3442.                                                               New York, 29 December 1956, 
15h. 30 
   Reserved.                                                                                                      (Received: 21h. 
40.)  
 
 
 
I am referring to my telegram n° 3411.  
 
I also questioned Mr. Hammarskjold about the continuation that he planned for the question 
of Hungary. First, the Secretary General denied having dissolved, as had been alleged, the 
Consultative Committee last month (my telegram n° 2516 of 17 November). Committee 
members had only let him know that they did not believe anymore to be able to be of any use, 
and he had agreed.  
 
As regards the task for which the Assembly had charged him by different resolutions, he saw 
between them some contradictions. On one hand, in fact, he considered himself as invested in 
a kind of a conciliation mission and task of persuasion, aiming to obtain the withdrawal of 
Soviet forces currently in Hungary. On the other hand, by asking him to send observers into 
Austria and possibly somewhere else, the Assembly had in fact asked him to constitute 
against the Soviets a real charge. If he assured responsibility for the latter, he would remove 
the possibility to fill his first mission. Yet, this one appeared of many the most important. 
Without wanting to deny that a conviction of the Soviets, like that pronounced by the 
Assembly on 12 December 1956, was both justified and inevitable, Mr. Hammarskjold 
considers that no practical conclusion can be derived from it, in the interests of the free world 
and the Hungarian people themselves, other ways must be looked for. 
 
The Secretary General showed himself convinced that the Soviets recognize that they can’t, in 
the long run, maintain their control over Hungary by the means which they have used since 
the end of October. He believed that a development in the sense of the one that occurred in 
Poland is possible and even probable. But the Soviet leaders must be allowed to “save face”. 
The negotiation about the disarmament could provide the opportunity, but also, seems to think 
Mr. Hammarskjold, a journey of the Secretary General of the United Nations to Budapest, if 
not even to Moscow. 
 
Mr. Hammarskjold estimates that the dramatic way in which the discussion of his possible 
mission in Hungary has, on 6th December 1956, focused on the fixing of a date is the cause of 
the failure of this project. He doesn’t give up so far; he believes in fact that he could, when the 
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time comes, exert on the Soviet leaders an effective pressure to convince them to withdraw 
their troops from Hungary.  
 
For all of these reasons, Mr. Hammarskjold would not want designate for himself the 
observers aimed by the resolutions of 19 November and 2 December 1956, but he proposes to 
ask the Assembly, as soon as the debate would be reopened, to establish an exclusive 
committee which would be responsible for carrying out the desired survey by the majority of 
delegations and which would take the responsibility of appointing the observers and to report 
their findings. As for him, he would save himself for accomplishing, when the circumstances 
would allow it, the mission of persuasion which appears to him the only way in his power to 
contribute to a solution of the question of Hungary.  
 
The plan of the Secretary General is unmistakably ingenious; if the Assembly is suited to it, it 
will allow Mr. Hammarskjold to get out, momentarily at least, of a situation that has become 
difficult. But I must note the Secretary General gave me yesterday, for the first time, the 
impression of bringing a real and sincere interest in the Hungarian question. He does not 
believe that he is in his role to formulate a moral judgement. He recognizes that we are 
obliged to employ towards the Russians a special tactic, but he seems concerned with good 
faith to obtain the best possible result.  
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